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#### Neolib isn’t a monolithic root cause but pervasive – micropolitics disseminates post-Fordist productivity into remote terrains of lived experience to corrupt dissent.

Papadopoulos 8 (Dimitris, School of Social Science @Cardiff U, Leicester Reader in Sociology and Organisation. “In the ruins of representation: Identity, individuality, subjectification”, British Journal of Social Psychology, 47.1, ebsco//shree)

The turn to micropolitics and the dissolution of the foundationalist understandings of identity (either in its essentialist or discursive reductionist versions) enable political analyses of previously neglected and effaced domains of everyday life. But do micropolitics effectively challenge state regulation and open pathways for the emergence of a multiplicity of different modes of embodied subjectification? Or does embodied subjectification become a new mode of state regulated existence? The power of micropolitics is thought to lie in the fact that they bypass the reproduction of the state as an intact and paramount entity of power. Micropolitics harness everyday lived and embodied experience as a vital matter of political struggles which aim to reinvigorate civil society, that is, the struggles of associations of people which develop outside of state institutions (Warner, 2002). However, seen historically, since the 1980s micropolitics have increasingly become integral to the effective realization of neoliberal governance. This is because this mode of engagement is aligned with transformations which have occurred at the level of the state. The neoliberal state is not a monolithic container, rather it disseminates into the most remote terrains of everyday experience. The dismantling of welfare systems has accelerated, and finally consolidated, the state’s withdrawal from the traditional role of centralized organizer of society. However, the result has not been the disappearance of the state itself, rather we are witnessing the disappearance of the welfare state and the emergence of new one (Fairbrother & Rainnie, 2005; Jessop, 2002; Sassen, 1999). Social control is primarily performed through the colonization of previously regarded private areas of individual existence: the body, health, fashion and well-being, sexuality, your living-room. In this process, embodied subjectification and micropolitics have become necessary elements for the functioning of the neoliberal state. The neoliberal state needs, more than self-regulating individuals, networked actors who actively forge the structures necessary for the transformation from centralized state powers to disseminated modes of neoliberal regulation (Marazzi, 1998; Neilson & Rossiter, 2005; Papadopoulos, 2003; Stephenson, 2003). Hence, although they arose as an attempt to challenge the overly narrow focus on the state, micropolitics have played a vital role in shifting the historical function of the state from centralized control into a disseminated form of control which operates effectively in the terrain of social and cultural life. In this sense, both state- and micropolitics articulate their political agenda inside the terrain of the state and affirm its function and centrality in social life. This is the moment where embodied subjectification and the broader project of critical psychology amplify the production of affirmative subjectivity, a subjectivity which paradoxically solidifies state regulation by operating at its margins. However, the generation of affirmative subjectivity is more than a form of political regulation in contemporary North-Atlantic societies. It is also a productive force in the literal sense. The traditional apparatus for measuring and diagnosing individual differences was insufficient as a response to the social and economical transformations related to post-Fordist labour (Bowring, 2002; Gorz, 2004; Lazzarato, 2002; Moulier Boutang, 2003; Williams, 1994). This is because post-Fordism appropriates as productive resources precisely these forms of individual action and experience, which refer to the totality of individual subjectivity: relationality, emotions, memory, communication, creativity and primarily, the totality of the body. Critical psychology’s conceptualization captures the core tenet of the post-Fordist transformation in a magnificent way: embodied subjectification becomes the algorithm for the realization of the process of the ‘subjectivization of work’, a process which lies in the heart of post-Fordist productivity (Lohr & Nickel, 2005; Moldaschl & Voss, 2003; Scho¨nberger & Springer, 2003). Yet critical psychology neither traces possible ruptures in the post-Fordist arrangement nor explores everyday forms of exodus and disobedience (Moulier Boutang, 1998; Virno, 2004). In other words, the critical psychological view of subjectification can elucidate, or diagnose, the productive role of the psychology in the social earthquake which accompanied the post-Fordist reorganization of labour and everyday sociality in North-Atlantic societies (Gordo-Lo´pez & Pujol Tarre´s, 2004; Papadopoulos, 2004). However, critical psychology is unable to engage with the suppressed potentialities of post-Fordist social relations which could lead to forms of political engagement that question post-Fordism itself (Karakayali & Tsianos, 2005; Negri, 1999; Santos, 2001; Stephenson, 2004). The reason for this is, as I argued above, that embodied subjectification is the core productive form of today’s sociality. Embodied subjectification is not only a heuristic tool which enables social researchers to understand power relations in post-Fordist North-Atlantic societies, but also the very guarantor of what Weber (1978) calls ‘legitimate domination’. A form of domination which is actively and willingly performed differently by each individual and congeals a form of power, which, following Hannah Arendt (1970), emerges not as a means to dominate but by the very fact that people act together. Embodied subjectification (and its very theoreticization by governmentality studies) is a form of obedience to today’s configuration of power in North-Atlantic societies. In this sense, micropolitics and embodied subjectification constitute a form of affirmative subjectivity in neoliberal and post-Fordist conditions. In the last part of the paper, I will briefly discuss Jacques Rancie`re’s concept of politics as a means for interfering in the production of affirmative subjectivity (for a more broad discussion of this issue s. Stephenson & Papadopoulos, 2006).

#### the aff is ludic feminism that reduces resistance to racial patriarchy to discourse and performance in private spheres like debate – displaces class struggle

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One of the questions I ask in this book is why the dominant feminist theory in the postmodern moment-ludic feminism-has largely abandoned the problems of labor and exploitation and ignored their relation to gender, sexuality, difference, desire, and subjectivity. It has done so at a time when “two-thirds of all labour in the world is done by women…In the Free Production Zones in South-East Asia, Africa, and Latin America, more than 70 percent of the labour force is female[,]…the majority… young women (14-24)” who are highly exploited and underpaid (Mies 117). The other side of this question is what ludic feminist theory has substituted in place of the economic. How does it explain social relations and the emerging world reality? Most importantly, does this explanation make transformation of the social possible? Following Foucault, Lacan, Derrida, and other postructuralist theorists, ludic feminism, including much recent socialist feminism, has articulated the social as discourse/textuality and posited desire/pleasure as the dynamics of the social. In so doing, it has displaced economics, labor, and class struggle. The cost of this displacement has been enormous for feminist politics, especially for socialist feminism. This, then, is clearly a moment of crisis for revolutionary politics, specifically feminism. Stanley Aronowitz, in a long essay, declares that the “socialist movement deserves a decent burial” (“Situation” 58). Socialist feminists, like Michele Barrett, are abandoning Marxism and a socially transformative politics altogether, and turning instead to a discursive, cultural politics founded on the anti-Marxist writings of Michel Foucault and other ludic postmodern theorists. In the preface to her Politics of Truth, for instance, Barrett announces her anti-Marxism: “I am nailing my coulours to the mast of a more general post-Marxism” (vii). But as Renate Bridenthal points out in her review of Barrett, “[W]here is this ship sailing to? This is not a time for intellectuals to be sailing away in a sea of indeterminacy” (220). Under the pressure of the dominant discourses of Postmodernism, Marxism, and historical materialism are becoming lost revolutionary knowledges for the current generation of feminists. Now, in place of a historical materialist analysis for social change, feminists are provided with models for “the care of the self,” for “performing” and “rematophorizing” difference, for “power feminism,” and for “sexual-agency feminism,” all of which trivialize the situation of women: reducing it to matters of textuality, desire, or voluntarism. But Marxism continues to haunt these practices. Jacques Derrida (from whom all post-Marxists have learned the deconstruction of the social) has arrived at a very different relation to Marxism-after devoting most of his philosophical writing to occluding Marxist knowledges. He now contests the new global “*dominant* discourse” that “proclaims: Marx is dead, communism is dead, very dead, and along with it its hopes, its discourse, its theories, and its practices” (*Specters* 51-52). Derrida declares, “Upon rereading the *[The Communist]* Manifesto and a few other great works of Marx…I know of few texts in the philosophical tradition, perhaps none, whose lesson seemed more urgent today” (13). He goes on to claim that “It will always be a fault not to read and reread and discuss Marx…It will be more and more of a fault, a failing of theoretical, philosophical, political responsibility” (13).

#### Capitalist patriarchy is an existential threat

Werholf 7 (Claudia von, CAPITALIST PATRIARCHY AND THE NEGATION OF MATRIARCHY. THE STRUGGLE FOR A “DEEP” ALTERNATIVE. in: Vaughan, Genevieve (ed.): Women and the Gift Economy. A Radically Different World View is Possible, Toronto 2007 (Inanna), pp. 139-153. <http://emanzipationhumanum.de/downloads/capitalistpatriarchy.pdf> //shree)

Many people have provided descriptions of globalization as global crisis and its dynamics (Chossudovski 1966; Hard and Negri 2000; Wallerstein 2004; Ziegler 2002). There seems to be “no future”—astonishingly enough even for the global players themselves. I call this situation west end: western civilizacion is in its final decline globally (Werlhof 2002). With the self-given “licence to loot” (Mies and Werlhof 2003; Werlhof 2000), the resources of the earth will come to an end. The decline of resources is already underway. With the resulting “resource wars” (Klare 2001)—the new global wars for oil and water—we are witnessing the beginning of the end of the “modern world system”, as a logical consequence. But, there is almost no deeper analysis of the causes of this extraordinary situation or the dynamics that seem to exclude any alternative. There is no real, no deeper explanation of the world’s dilemma and its causes. For example, is the profit motive alone sufficient as an explanation? Why do most people believe that human nature is nothing but ego-centric? What about control and domination of nature? In what is it rooted? I suggest the reason why most people do not really know why this crisis is happening is due to the fact that the left as well as the right, and the sciences in general, have never really analyzed patriarchy. And not having analyzed patriarchy also means not really understanding capitalism, because the two not only share a time of being together on this earth for 500 years now, but are deeply related to each other in a way that has not been understood by most people, even feminists. Therefore, it is time to take the necessary step of analyzing capitalist patriarchy from its roots and as a theoretical concept for the subsequent analysis of society. Only then can it be seen that patriarchy is much more than just a word for polemical purposes. It can instead be understood as a concept that explains the character of the entire social order in which we are living today, socialism included (Werlhof 2007).

#### Vote neg for a historical materialist world-systems approach.

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Today the terms “world economy”, “world market”, and “globalization” are commonplace, appearing in the sound-bites of politicians, media commentators, and unemployed workers alike. But few know that the most important source for these phrases lies with work started by sociologists in the early Seventies. At a time when the mainstream assumption of accepted social, political, and economic science held that the “wealth of nations” reflected mainly on the cultural developments within those nations, a growing group of social scientists recognized that national “development” could be best understood as the complex outcome of local interactions with an aggressively expanding Europe-centered “world-system” (Wallerstein 1974; Frank 1978).1 Not only did these scientists perceive the global nature of economic networks 20 years before they entered popular discourse, but they also saw that many of these networks extend back at least 600 years. Over this time, the peoples of the globe became linked into one integrated unit: the modern world-system. Now, 20 years on, social scientists working in the area are trying to understand the history and evolution of the whole system, as well as how local, national and regional entities have been integrated into it. This current research has required broadening our perspective to include deeper temporal and larger spatial frameworks. For example, some recent research has compared the modern Europe-centered world-system of the last six hundred years with earlier, smaller intersocietal networks that have existed for millennia (Frank and Gills 1993; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). Other work uses the knowledge of cycles and trends that has grown out of world-systems research to anticipate likely future events with a precision impossible before the advent of the theory. This is still a new field and much remains to be done, but enough has already been achieved to provide a valuable understanding of the phenomenon of globalization. The discourse about globalization has emerged mainly in the last decade. The term means many different things, and there are many reasons for its emergence as a popular concept. The usage of this term generally implies that a recent change (within the last decade or two) has occurred in technology and in the size of the arena of economic competition. The general idea is that information technology has created a context in which the global market, rather than separate national markets, is the relevant arena for economic competition. It then follows that economic competitiveness needs to be assessed in the global context, rather than in a national or local context. These notions have been used to justify the adoption of new practices by firms and governments all over the world and these developments have altered the political balances among states, firms, unions and other interest groups. The first task is to put this development into historical context. The world-systems perspective has shown that intersocietal geopolitics and geoeconomics has been the relevant arena of competition for national-states, firms and classes for hundreds of years. The degree of international connectedness of economic and political/military networks was already important in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The first “transnational corpora-tions” (TNCs) were the great chartered companies of the seventeenth century. They organized both production and exchange on an intercontinental scale. The rise and fall of hegemonic core powers, which continues today with the relative decline of the United States hegemony, was already in full operation in the seventeenth century rise and fall of Dutch hegemony (see Arrighi 1994; Modelski and Thompson 1996; Taylor 1996). The capitalist world-economy has experienced cyclical processes and secular trends for hundreds of years (Chase-Dunn 1998:Chapter 2). The cyclical processes include the rise and fall of hegemons, the Kondratieff wave (a forty to sixty year business cycle)2 , a cycle of warfare among core states (Goldstein 1988), and cycles of colonization and decolonization (Bergesen and Schoenberg 1980). The world-system has also experienced several secular trends including a long-term proletarianization of the world work force, growing concentration of capital into larger and larger firms, increasing internationalization of capital investment and of trade, and accelerating internationalization of political structures. In this perspective, globalization is a long-term upward trend of political and economic change that is affected by cyclical processes. The most recent technological changes, and the expansions of international trade and investment, are part of these long-run changes. One question is exactly how the most recent changes compare with the long-run trends? And what are the important continuities as well as the qualitative differences that accompany these changes? These are the questions that I propose to explore. types of globalization There are at least five different dimensions of globalization that need to be distinguished. There are also several misunderstandings and misinterpretations that need to be clarified. Let us evaluate five different meanings of globalization: (1) Common ecological constraints This aspect of globalization involves global threats due to our fragile ecosystem and the globalization of ecological risks. Anthropogenic causes of ecological degradation have long operated, and these in turn have affected human social evolution (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). But ecological degradation has only recently begun to operate on a global scale. This fact creates a set of systemic constraints that require global collective action. (2) Cultural globalization This aspect of globalization relates to the diffusion of two sets of cultural phenomena: • the proliferation of individualized values, originally of Western origin, to ever larger parts of the world population. These values are expressed in social constitutions that recognize individual rights and identities and transnational and international efforts to protect “human rights.” • the adoption of originally Western institutional practices. Bureaucratic organization and rationality, belief in a law-like natural universe, the values of economic efficiency and political democracy have been spreading throughout the world since they were propagated in the European Enlightenment (Meyer 1996; Markoff 1996). Whereas some of the discussions of the world polity assume that cultural components have been a central aspect of the modern world-system from the start (e.g. Meyer 1989; Mann 1986), I emphasize the comparatively non-normative nature of the modern world-system (Chase-Dunn 1998: Chapter 5). But I acknowledge the growing salience of cultural consensus in the last 100 years. Whereas the modern world-system has always been, and is still, multicultural, the growing influence and acceptance of Western values of rationality, individualism, equality, and efficiency is an important trend of the twentieth century. (3) Globalization of communication Another meaning of globalization is connected with the new era of information technology. Anthony Giddens(1996) insists that social space comes to acquire new qualities with generalized electronic communications, albeit only in the networked parts of the world. In terms of accessibility, cost and velocity, the hitherto more local political and geographic parameters that structured social relationships are greatly expanded. One may well argue that time-space compression (Harvey 1989) by new information technologies is simply an extension and acceleration of the very long-term trend toward technological development over the last ten millenia (Chase-Dunn 1994). Yet, the rapid decrease in the cost of communications may have qualitatively altered the relationship between states and consciousness and this may be an important basis for the formation of a much stronger global civil society. Global communication facilities have the power to move things visible and invisible from one part of the globe to another whether any nation-state likes it or not. This applies not only to economic exchange, but also to ideas, and these new networks of communication can create new political groups and alignments. How, and to what extent, will this undermine the power of states to structure social relationships? (4) Economic globalization Economic globalization means globe-spanning economic relationships. The interrelationships of markets, finance, goods and services, and the networks created by transnational corporations are the most important manifestations of this. Though the capitalist world-system has been international in essence for centuries, the extent and degree of trade and investment globalization has increased greatly in recent decades. Economic globalization has been accelerated by what information technology has done to the movement of money. It is commonly claimed that the market’s ability to shift money from one part of the globe to another by the push of a button has changed the rules of policy-making, putting economic decisions much more at the mercy of market forces than before. The world-system has undergone major waves of economic globalization before, especially in the last decades of the the nineteenth century. One important question is whether or not the most recent wave has actually integrated the world to a qualitatively greater extent that it was integrated during the former wave. All the breathy discussions of global capitalism and global society assume that this is the case, but careful comparative research indicates that this is not so (see below and Chase-Dunn, Kawano and Brewer 2000). (5) Political globalization Political globalization consists of the institutionalization of international political structures. The Europe-centered world-system has been primarily constituted as an interstate system—a system of conflicting and allying states and empires. Earlier world-systems, in which accumulation was mainly accomplished by means of institutionalized coercive power, experienced an oscillation between multicentric interstate systems and core-wide world empires in which a single “universal” state conquered all or most of the core states in a region. The Europe-centered system has also experienced a cyclical alternation between political centralization and decentralization, but this has taken the form of the rise and fall of hegemonic core states that do not conquer the other core states. Hence the modern world-system has remained multicentric in the core, and this is due mainly to the shift toward a form of accumulation based more on the production and profitable sale of commodities—capitalism. The hegemons have been the most thoroughly capitalist states and they have preferred to follow a strategy of controlling trade and access to raw material imports from the periphery rather than conquering other core states to extract tribute or taxes. Power competition in an interstate system does not require much in the way of cross-state cultural consensus to operate systemically. But since the early nineteenth century the European interstate system has been developing both an increasingly consensual international normative order and a set of international political structures that regulate all sorts of interaction. This phenomenon has been termed “global governance” by Craig Murphy (1994) and others. It refers to the growth of both specialized and general international organizations. The general organizations that have emerged are the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations and the United Nations. The sequence of these “proto-world-states” constitutes a process of institution-building, but unlike earlier “universal states” this one is slowly emerging by means of condominium among core states rather than conquest. This is the trend of political globalization. It is yet a weak, but persistent, concentration of sovereignty in international institutions. If it continues it will eventuate in a single global state that could effectively outlaw warfare and enforce its illegality. The important empirical question, analogous to the discussion of economic globalization above, is the relative balance of power between international and global political organizations vis a vis national states. We assume this to be an upward trend, but like economic globalization it probably is also a cycle. Measuring Economic Globalization The brief discussion above of economic globalization implies that it is a long-run upward trend. The idea is that international economic competition as well as geopolitical competition were already important in the fourteenth century and that they became increasingly important as more and more international trade and international investment occurred. In its simplest form this would posit a linear upward trend of economic globalization. An extreme alternative hypothesis about economic globalization would posit a completely unintegrated world composed of autarchic national economies until some point (perhaps in the last few decades) at which a completely global market for commodities and capital suddenly emerged. Let us examine data that can tell us more about the temporal emergence of economic globalization. There are potentially a large number of different indicators of economic globalization and they may or may not exhibit similar patterns with respect to change over time. Trade globalization can be operationalized as the proportion of all world production that crosses international boundaries. Investment globalization would be the proportion of all invested capital in the world that is owned by non-nationals (i.e. “foreigners”). And we could also investigate the degree of economic integration of countries by determining the extent to which national economic growth rates are correlated across countries. 3 It would be ideal to have these measures over several centuries, but comparable fi gures are not available before the nineteenth century, and indeed even these are sparse and probably unrepresentative of the whole system until well into the twentieth century. Nevertheless we can learn some important things by examining those comparable data that are available. Figure 1 shows trade and investment globalization. Trade globalization is the ratio of estimated total world exports (the sum of the value of exports of all countries) divided by an estimate of total world product (the sum of all the national GDPs). Investment globalization is the total book value of all foreign direct investment divided by the total world product. The trade globalization figures show the hypothesized upward trend as well as a downturn that occurred between 1929 and 1950. Note that the time scale in Figure 1 is distorted by the paucity of data before 1950. It is possible that important changes in trade globalization are not visible in this series because of the wide temporal gaps in the data. Indeed a more recent study has shown that this is the case. There was a shorter and less well-defined wave of trade globalization from 1900 to 1929 (Chase-Dunn, Kawano and Brewer 2000). Figure 1 also shows that the trade indicator differs in some ways from the investment indicator. Investment globalization was higher (or as high) in 1913 as it was in 1991, while trade globalization was considerably lower in 1913 than it was in 1992. We have fewer time points for the investment data, so we cannot tell for sure about the shape of the changes that took place, but these two series imply that different indicators of economic globalization may show somewhat different trajectories. More research needs to be done on investment globalization to determine its exact trajectory and for comparison with trade globalization and other world-system cycles and trends. A third indicator of economic globalization is the correlation of national GDP growth rates (Grimes 1993). This shows the extent to which periods of national economic growth and stagnation have been synchronized across countries. In a fully integrated global economy it would be expected that growth and stagnation periods would be synchronized across countries and so there would be a high correlation of national growth rates. Grimes shows that, contrary to the hypothesis of a secular upward trend toward increasing global integration, the correlation among national growth rates fluctuates cyclically over the past two centuries. In a data series from 1860 to 1988 Grimes found two periods in which national economic growth decline sequences are highly correlated across countries: - 1913-1927; and after 1970. Before and in between these peaks are periods of very low synchronization. Further research needs to be done to determine the temporal patterns of different sorts of economic globalization. At this point we can say that the step-function version of a sudden recent leap to globalization can be rejected. The evidence we have indicates that there are both long-term secular trends and huge cyclical oscillations. Trade globalization shows a long-term trend with a big dip during the depression of the 1930s. The investment globalization indicates a cycle with at least two peaks, one before World War I and one after 1980. Grimes’s indicator of synchronous economic growth indicates a cyclical fluctuation with one peak in the 1920s and another since 1970. These results, especially those that imply cycles, indicate that change occurs relatively quickly and that the most recent period of globalization shares important features with earlier periods of intense international economic interaction. The question of the similarities and differences between the most recent wave and earlier waves of globalization is clearly an important one. systemic cycles of accumulation Giovanni Arrighi (1994) shows how hegemony in the modern world system has evolved in a series of “systemic cycles of accumulation” (SCAs) in which finance capital has employed different forms of organization and different relationships with organized state power. These qualitative organizational changes have accompanied the secular increase in the power of money and markets as regulatory forces in the modern world-system. The SCAs have been occurring in the Europe-centered world-system since at least the fourteenth century. Arrighi’s model shows both the similarities and the differences in the relationships that obtain between financial capital and states within the different systemic cycles of accumulation. The British SCA and the American SCA had both similarities and important differences. The main differences that Arrighi emphasizes are the “internalization of transaction costs” (represented by the vertical integration of TNCs) and the extent to which the U.S. tried to create “organized capitalism” on a global scale. The British SCA had fewer global firms and pushed hard for international free trade. The U.S. SCA is characterized by a much heavier focus on global firms and by a more structured approach to “global governance” possibly intended to produce economic growth in other core regions, especially those that are geopolitically strategic. Arrighi argues that President Roosevelt used the power of the hegemonic state to try to create a balanced world of capitalist growth. This sometimes meant going against the preferences of finance capital and U.S. corporations. For example, the Japanese miracle was made possible because the U.S. government prevented U.S. corporations from turning Japan (and Korea) into just one more dependent and peripheralized country. This policy of enlightened global Keynesianism was continued in a somewhat constrained form under later presidents, albeit in the guise of domestic “military Keynesianism” justified by the Soviet threat. In this interpretation the big companies and the finance capitalists returned to power with the decline in competitiveness of the U.S. economy. The rise of the Eurodollar market forced Nixon to abandon the Bretton Woods financial structure, and this was followed by ReaganismThatcherism, IMF structural adjustment, streamlining, deregulation and the delegitimation of anything that constrained the desires of global capital investment. The idea that we are all subject to the forces of a global market-place, and that any constraint on the freedom to invest will result in a deficit of “competitiveness,” is a powerful justification for destroying the institutions of the “Second Wave” (e.g. labor unions, welfare, agricultural subsidies, etc.).4 Under conditions of increased economic globalization the ability of national states to protect their citizens from world market forces decreases. This results increasing inequalities within countries, and increasing levels of dis-satisfaction compared to the relative harmony of national integration achieved under the Keynesian regimes. It is also produces political reactions, especially national-populist movements.5 Indeed, Philip McMichael (1996) attributes the anti-government movements now occurring in the U.S. West, including the bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, to the frustrations caused by the deregulation of U.S. agriculture. It would also be useful to investigate the temporal patterns of the other types of globalization: cultural,6 political, technological and ecological. Of interest too are the relationships between these and economic globalization. Much empirical work needs to be done to operationalize these concepts and to assemble the relevant information. Here, for now, I will hypothesize that all these types exhibit both long-run secular and cyclical features. I will also surmise that cultural and political globalization are lagged behind the secular upward trend of economic globalization. the politics of globalization This last hypothesis bears on the question of adjustments of political and social institutions to increases in economic and technological globalization. I would submit that the current period of economic globalization has occurred in part due to technological changes that are linked to Kondratieff waves, and in part because of the profit squeezes and declining hegemony of the U.S. economy in the larger world market. 7 The financial aspects of the current period of economic globalization began when President Nixon canceled the Bretton Woods agreement in response to pressures on the value of the U.S. dollar coming from the rapidly growing Eurodollar market (Harvey 1995). This occurred in 1967, and this date is used by many to mark the beginning of a K-wave downturn. The saturation of the world market demand for the products of the post-World War II upswing, the constraints on capital accumulation posed by business unionism and the political entitlements of the welfare states in core countries caused a profit squeeze that motivated large firms and investors and their political helpers to try to break out of these constraints. The possibilities for global investment opened up by new communications and information technology created new maneuverability for capital. The demise of the Soviet Union8 added legitimacy to the revitalized ideology of the free market and this ideology swept the Earth. Not only Reagan and Thatcher, but Eurocommunists and labor governments in both the core and the periphery, adopted the ideology of the “lean state,” deregulation, privatization and the notion that everything must be evaluated in terms of global efficiency and competitiveness. Cultural globalization has been a very long-term upward trend since the emergence of the world religions in which any person, regardless of ethnicity or kinship, could become a member of the moral community by confessing faith in the “universal” god. But moral and political cosmography has usually encompassed a smaller realm than the real dimensions of the objective trade and political/military networks in which people have been involved. What has occurred at the end of the twentieth century is a near convergence between subjective cosmography and objective networks. The main cause of this is probably the practical limitation of human habitation to the planet Earth. But the long-run declining costs of transportation and communications are also an important element. Whatever the causes, the emergent reality is one in which consciousness embraces (or goes beyond) the real systemic networks of interaction. This geographical feature of the global system is one of its uniquenesses, and it makes possible for the future a level of normative order that has not existed since human societies were very small and egalitarian (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997a). The ideology of globalization has undercut the support and the rationale behind all sorts of so-called Second Wave institutions—labor unions, socialist parties, welfare programs, and communist states. While these institutions have not been destroyed everywhere, the politicians of the right (e.g. Newt Gingrich in the U.S.) have explicitly argued for their elimination. At the same time, the very technologies that made capitalist economic globalization possible also have the potential to allow those who do not benefit from the free reign of capital to organize new forms of resistance, or to revitalize old forms. It is now widely agreed by many, even in the financial community, that the honeymoon of neo-liberalism will eventually end and that the rough edges of global capitalism will need to be buffed. Patrick Buchanan, a conservative candidate for the U.S. presidency in 1996, tried to capitalize on popular resentment of corporate downsizing. The Wall Street Journal has reported that stock analysts worry about the “lean and mean” philosophy becoming a fad that has the potential to delegitimate the business system and to create political backlashes. This was expressed in the context of a discussion of the announcement of huge bonuses for AT&T executives following another round of downsizing. I already mentioned the difficulties that states are having in controlling communications on the Internet. I do not believe the warnings of those who predict a massive disruption of civilization by hordes of sociopaths waging “cyberwar”9 But I do think that the new communications technologies provide new opportunities for the less powerful to organize themselves to respond should global capitalism run them over or leave them out. The important question is what are the most useful organizational forms for resistance? What we already see are all sorts of nutty localisms, nationalisms and a proliferation of identity politics. The militias of the U.S. West are ordering large amounts of fertilizer with which to resist the coming of the “Blue Helmets”—a fantasized world state that is going to take away their handguns and assualt rifles.10 Localisms and specialized identities are the postmodern political forms that are supposedly produced by information technology, flexible specialization, and global capitalism (Harvey 1989). I think that at least some of this trend is a result of desperation and the demise of plausible alternatives in the face of the ideological hegemony of neoliberalism and the much-touted triumph of efficiency over justice. Be that as it may, a historical perspective on the latest phase of globalization allows us to see the long-run patterns of interaction between capitalist expansion and the movements of opposition that have tried to protect people from the negative aspects of market forces and exploitation. And this perspective has implications for going beyond the impasse of the present to build a more cooperative and humane global system (Boswell and Chase-Dunn 1999). the spiral of capitalism and socialism The interaction between expansive commodification and resistance movements can be denoted as “the spiral of capitalism and socialism.” The world-systems perspective provides a view of the long-term interaction between the expansion and deepening of capitalism and the efforts of people to protect themselves from exploitation and domination. The historical development of the communist states is explained as part of a long-run spiraling interaction between expanding capitalism and socialist counter-responses. The history and developmental trajectory of the communist states can be explained as socialist movements in the semiperiphery that attempted to transform the basic logic of capitalism, but which ended up using socialist ideology to mobilize industrialization for the purpose of catching up with core capitalism. The spiraling interaction between capitalist development and socialist movements can be seen in the history of labor movements, socialist parties and communist states over the last 200 years. This long-run comparative perspective enables one to see recent events in China, Russia and Eastern Europe in a framework that has implications for the future of social democracy. The metaphor of the spiral means this: both capitalism and socialism affect one another’s growth and organizational forms. Capitalism spurs socialist responses by exploiting and dominating peoples, and socialism spurs capitalism to expand its scale of production and market integration and to revolutionize technology. Defined broadly, socialist movements are those political and organizational means by which people try to protect themselves from market forces, exploitation and domination, and to build more cooperative institutions. The sequence of industrial revolutions, by which capitalism has restructured production and taken control of labor, have stimulated a series of political organizations and institutions created by workers to protect their livelihoods. This happened differently under different political and economic conditions in different parts of the world-system. Skilled workers created guilds and craft unions. Less skilled workers created industrial unions. Sometimes these coalesced into labor parties that played important roles in supporting the development of political democracies, mass education and welfare states (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992). In other regions workers were less politically successful, but managed at least to protect access to rural areas or subsistence plots for a fall-back or hedge against the insecurities of employment in capitalist enterprises. To some extent the burgeoning contemporary “informal sector” in both core and peripheral societies provides such a fall-back. The mixed success of workers’ organizations also had an impact on the further development of capitalism. In some areas workers or communities were successful at raising the wage bill or protecting the environment in ways that raised the costs of production for capital. When this happened capitalists either displaced workers by automating them out of jobs or capital migrated to where fewer constraints allowed cheaper production. The process of capital flight is not a new feature of the world-system. It has been an important force behind the uneven development of capitalism and the spreading scale of market integration for centuries. Labor unions and socialist parties were able to obtain some power in certain states, but capitalism became yet more international. Firm size increased. International markets became more and more important to successful capitalist competition. Fordism, the employment of large numbers of easily-organizable workers in centralized production locations, has been supplanted by “flexible accumulation” (small firms producing small customized products) and global sourcing (the use of substitutable components from broadly dispersed competing producers), are all production strategies that make traditional labor organizing approaches much less viable. communist states in the world-system Socialists were able to gain state power in certain semiperipheral states and use this power to create political mechanisms of protection against competition with core capital. This was not a wholly new phenomenon. As discussed below, capitalist semiperipheral states had done and were doing similar things. But, the communist states claimed a fundamentally oppositional ideology in which socialism was allegedly a superior system that would eventually replace capitalism. Ideological opposition is a phenomenon which the capitalist world-economy has seen before. The geopolitical and economic battles of the Thirty Years War were fought in the name of Protestantism against Catholicism. The content of the ideology may make some difference for the internal organization of states and parties, but every contender must be able to legitimate itself in the eyes and hearts of its cadre. The claim to represent a qualitatively different and superior socio-economic system is not evidence that the communist states were indeed structurally autonomous from world capitalism. The communist states severely restricted the access of core capitalist firms to their internal markets and raw materials, and this constraint on the mobility of capital was an important force behind the post-World War II upsurge in the spatial scale of market integration and a new revolution of technology. In certain areas capitalism was driven to further revolutionize technology or to improve living conditions for workers and peasants because of the demonstration effect of propinquity to a communist state. U.S. support for state-led industrialization of Japan and Korea (in contrast to U.S. policy in Latin America) is only understandable as a geopolitical response to the Chinese revolution. The existence of “two superpowers”—one capitalist and one communist—in the period since World War II provided a fertile context for the success of international liberalism within the “capitalist” bloc. This was the political/military basis of the rapid growth of transnational corporations and the latest revolutionary “time-space compression” (Harvey 1989). This technological revolution has once again restructured the international division of labor and created a new regime of labor regulation called “flexible accumulation.” The process by which the communist states have become reintegrated into the capitalist world-system has been long, as described below. But, the final phase of reintegration was provoked by the inability to be competitive with the new form of capitalist regulation. Thus, capitalism spurs socialism, which spurs capitalism, which spurs socialism again in a wheel that turns and turns while getting larger. The economic reincorporation of the communist states into the capitalist world-economy did not occur recently and suddenly. It began with the mobilization toward autarchic industrialization using socialist ideology, an effort that was quite successful in terms of standard measures of economic development. Most of the communist states were increasing their percentage of world product and energy consumption up until the 1980s. The economic reincorporation of the communist states moved to a new stage of integration with the world market and foreign firms in the 1970s. Andre Gunder Frank (1980:chapter 4) documented a trend toward reintegration in which the communist states increased their exports for sale on the world market, increased imports from the avowedly capitalist countries, and made deals with transnational firms for investments within their borders. The economic crisis in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was not much worse than the economic crisis in the rest of the world during the global economic downturn that began in the late 1960s (see Boswell and Peters 1990, Table 1). Data presented by World Bank analysts indicates that GDP growth rates were positive in most of the “historically planned economies” in Europe until 1989 or 1990 (Marer et al, 1991: Table 7a). Put simply, the big transformations that occurred in the Soviet Union and China after 1989 were part of a process that had long been underway since the 1970s. The big socio-political changes were a matter of the superstructure catching up with the economic base. The democratization of these societies is, of course, a welcome trend, but democratic political forms do not automatically lead to a society without exploitation or domination. The outcomes of current political struggles are rather uncertain in most of the ex-communist countries. New types of authoritarian regimes seem at least as likely as real democratization. As trends in the last two decades have shown, austerity regimes, deregulation and marketization within nearly all of the communist states occurred during the same period as similar phenomena in non-communist states. The synchronicity and broad similarities between Reagan/Thatcher deregulation and attacks on the welfare state, austerity socialism in most of the rest of the world, and increasing pressures for marketization in the Soviet Union and China are all related to the B-phase downturn of the Kondratieff wave, as are the current moves toward austerity and privatization in many semiperipheral and peripheral states. The trend toward privatization, deregulation and market-based solutions among parties of the Left in almost every country is thoroughly documented by Lipset (1991). Nearly all socialists with access to political power have abandoned the idea of doing more than buffing off the rough edges of capitalism. The way in which the pressures of a stagnating world economy impact upon national policies certainly varies from country to country, but the ability of any single national society to construct collective rationality is limited by its interaction within the larger system. The most recent expansion of capitalist integration, termed “globalization of the economy,” has made autarchic national economic planning seem anachronistic. Yet, a political reaction against economic globalization is now under way in the form of revived ex-communist parties, economic nationalism (e.g., Pat Buchanan, the Brazilian military) and a coalition of oppositional forces who are critiquing the ideological hegemony of neo-liberalism (e.g., Ralph Nader, environmentalists, populists of the right, etc.). Political Implications of the World-System Perspective The age of U.S. hegemonic decline and the rise of post-modernist philosophy have cast the liberal ideology of the European Enlightenment (science, progress, rationality, liberty, democracy and equality) into the dustbin of totalizing universalisms. It is alleged that these values have been the basis of imperialism, domination and exploitation and, thus, they should be cast out in favor of each group asserting its own set of values. Note that self-determination and a considerable dose of multiculturalism (especially regarding religion) were already central elements in Enlightenment liberalism. The structuralist and historical materialist world-systems approach poses this problem of values in a different way. The problem with the capitalist world-system has not been with its values. The philosophy of liberalism is fine. It has quite often been an embarrassment to the pragmatics of imperial power and has frequently provided justifications for resistance to domination and exploitation. The philosophy of the enlightenment has never been a major cause of exploitation and domination. Rather, it was the military and economic power generated by capitalism that made European hegemony possible.

### t-core---1nc

#### interp and violation: core antitrust laws are Sherman and Clayton

Teo Spengler 19. J.D. Reviewed by: Michelle Seidel, B.Sc., LL.B., MBA. “Consumer Laws: California Consumer Rights & Responsibilities”. Legal Beagle. https://legalbeagle.com/13720462-consumer-laws-california-consumer-rights-responsibilities.html

Federal and State Antitrust Laws

Antitrust laws are intended to protect consumers by not letting any business corner the market in a way that precludes competition. These laws protect free trade from unfair restraints, monopolies and price fixing. Antitrust vigilance helps consumers by ensuring fair prices for goods and services, a range of products to choose from and innovative, quality goods and services.

The core antitrust laws are federal – the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. California's complementary laws are found in the Cartwright Act, Business and Professions Code Section 16720 and following sections. These laws bar agreements among competitors that would fix prices or allocate customers or markets. California law offers a more detailed list of forbidden actions than that included in the federal law's general prohibitions against restraints of trade. The California Attorney General enforces antitrust laws by reviewing business mergers, investigating violations of the law and litigation.

#### they violate---fosta sesta isn’t antitrust

#### vote neg:

#### 1---limits---only brightline---otherwise every act in the u.s. code is topical

#### 2---ground---regs counteprlan is core neg ground because it means we can answer antitrust key warrants---if aff isn’t antitrust then it’s a reg

### t-usfg---1nc

#### interpretation---the resolution divides of aff and neg ground---it was negotiated and announced in advance, providing both teams a reasonable opportunity to prepare---only a textual reading of the resolution provides a predictable basis for research

#### the USFG means the three branches.

OECD 87. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Control and Management of Government Expenditure. 179. Google Book.

1. Political and organizational structure of government The United States America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information). The Federal Government is composed of three branches: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

#### resolved means to enact by law

Words & Phrases 64. Permanent Edition.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### “core antitrust laws” are The Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act

Thomas Horton 10. Professor of Law and Heidepriem Trial Advocacy Fellow, University of South Dakota School of Law. “Rediscovering Antitrust's Lost Values.” The University of New Hampshire Law Review. https://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1305&context=unh\_lr

Part II of this Article discusses Congress’s historical balancing and blending of fundamental political, social, moral, and economic values to create a constitutional-like set of flexible laws that can be adapted to unforeseen and changing economic and political circumstances.22 Part II.A. briefly reviews some of the extensive scholarship addressing Congress’s balancing of values and objectives in its core antitrust laws including the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts. Parts II.B. and C. explore the less-studied balancing of political, social, moral, and economic values and objectives in more recent antitrust legislation.23 Part II.B. specifically examines the legislative debates undergirding the passage of the HSR Act. 24 Part II.C. then turns to the debates and discourse that led to the passage of the NCRA in 1984 and the subsequent National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993 and 2004. 25

#### violation---they don’t defend usfg action that substantially expands the scope of its core antitrust laws

#### vote neg:

#### 1---fairness---the neg should win on average 50% of the time---any unfair advantage is a reason they should lose---their arguments are shaped by the drive to win, so presume their arguments are in bad faith

#### 2---clash---debate requires stasis to motivate research that develops third- and fourth-line responses---that’s key to effective politics and activism regardless of your personal beliefs---their interpretation explodes limits, makes the aff conditional, and forces the neg into concessionary ground

### disad---ftc---1nc

#### FTC’s increasing enforcement in privacy now---it’s focused on algorithmic bias.

James V. Fazio 21. Special counsel in the Intellectual Property Practice Group at Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, with Liisa M. Thomas, 3/11. “What Is FTC’s Course Under Biden?” https://www.natlawreview.com/article/what-ftc-s-course-under-biden

The new acting FTC chair, Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, recently signaled that the FTC may increase enforcement and penalties in the privacy and data security realm. Slaughter pointed to several areas of focus for the FTC this year, which companies will want to keep in mind: Notifying Consumers About FTC Allegations: Slaughter referred favorably to two recent cases: (1) the Everalbum biometric settlement from earlier this year (which we wrote about at the time); and (2) the Flo Health settlement over alleged deceptive data sharing practices (which we also wrote about at the time). In drawing on these two cases, Slaughter indicated that in future cases the FTC intends to include as part of any settlement a requirement to notify customers of any FTC allegations. This, she said, would allow consumers to “vote with their feet” and help them decide whether to recommend their services to others. FTC Intent to Plead All Relevant Violations: According to Slaughter, another lesson the FTC is taking from the Flo case is to include in the cases it brings all potentially applicable violations of all relevant privacy-related laws. In the Flo case, Slaughter said the FTC should have pleaded a violation of the Health Breach Notification Rule, which requires that vendors of personal health records notify consumers of data breaches. Focus on Ed Tech and COPPA: Given the explosive growth of education technology during COVID-19, the FTC is conducting an industry sweep of the industry. Related to this, the FTC is reviewing its Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule. This goes beyond the refresh the agency did of their FAQs earlier in the pandemic (which we wrote about at the time). For now, Slaughter reminds companies that parental consent is needed before collecting information online from children under the age of 13. Examination of Health Apps: The FTC will take a closer look at health apps, including telehealth and contact tracing apps, as more and more consumers are relying on such apps to manage their health during the pandemic. Overlap Between Competition and Privacy: Slaughter also indicated that it is worth looking at situations where there may be not only privacy concerns, but antitrust as well. Because the FTC has a dual mission (consumer protection and competition) she notes that it has a “structural advantage” over other regulators in that it can look at these issues, especially since -she states- “many of the largest players in digital markets are as powerful as they are because of the breadth of their access to and control over consumer data.” Racial Equality and AI/Biometrics/Geotracking: Slaughter noted that COVID-19 is exacerbating racial inequities. She pointed to the unequal access to technology, as well as algorithmic discrimination (the idea that discrimination offline becomes embedded into algorithmic system logic). The FTC intends to focus on algorithmic discrimination, as well as on the discrimination potentially embedded into facial recognition technologies. (This mirrors concerns that gave rise to the recent Portland facial recognition law, which we recently wrote about). Finally, Slaughter commented on the use of location data to identify characteristics of Black Lives Matter protesters, and said she is concerned about the misuse of location data to track Americans engaged in constitutionally protected speech. Putting it Into Practice: Companies that operate health apps, that are in the education technology space, or that use algorithms or facial recognition tools will want to keep in mind that these are areas of focus for the FTC. And for everyone, keep in mind that the FTC has indicated it will beef up privacy law penalties and will ask for more notification to injured consumers.

#### Antitrust enforcement saps up FTC resources and personnel, which are finite.

Tara L. Reinhart, et al. 21. \*\*Head of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP’s Antitrust/Competition Group. \*\*Steven C. Sunshine, Co-head of Skadden, Arps, Slat, Meagher & Flom LLP’s Antitrust/Competition Group. \*\*David P. Whales, antitrust lawyer with over 25 years of experience in both private and public sectors. \*\*Julia Y. York, partner at Skadden, Arps, Slat, Meagher & Flom LLP. \*\*Bre Jordan, associate at Skadden, Arps, Slat, Meagher & Flom LLP focusing on antitrust law. “Lina Khan’s Appointment as FTC Chair Reflects Biden Administration’s Aggressive Stance on Antitrust Enforcement.” 6/18/21. https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2021/06/lina-khans-appointment-as-ftc-chair

Second, like all antitrust enforcers, Ms. Khan and the FTC will face resource constraints. Bringing antitrust litigation is an expensive and laborious process, often requiring millions of dollars for expert fees and a large army of FTC staff attorneys and taking many months or even years to accomplish. Typically, the FTC can only litigate a handful of antitrust matters at a time. It seems likely that Congress will provide more funding to the FTC in the current environment, but even with these extra resources, the FTC will still have to pick its cases carefully and cannot challenge every deal or every instance of alleged unlawful conduct.

#### That trades off with the necessary resources for privacy enforcement.

John O. McGinnis\* and Linda Sun\*\* 20. \*George C. Dix Professor, Northwestern University, and Associate-Designate, Wilmer Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP. “Unifying Antitrust Enforcement for the Digital Age.” Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 20-20. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3669087

The FTC needs more resources to adequately address the nation’s growing privacy concerns. Currently, the FTC oversees both consumer protection—encompassing privacy—and antitrust,249 making the FTC the chief federal agency on privacy policy and enforcement250 and the nation’s de-facto privacy agency.251 The agency has long-standing experience in enforcing privacy statutes252 and also has special privacy assets, such as an internet lab capable of high-quality tech forensics to track invasions of privacy.253 The FTC, however, has failed to keep pace with the massive growth of privacy concerns—a phenomenon also driven by modern technology. Very few Americans feel conﬁdent in the privacy of their information in the digital age.254 According to a 2019 study, over 80% of Americans feel that they have little to no control over the data collected on them by companies and the government.255 To adequately address privacy concerns, the FTC needs more resources.256 The agency has been explicit that it needs more manpower to police tech companies. In requesting increased funding from Congress, FTC Director Joseph Simons said the money would allow the agency to hire additional staff and bring more privacy cases.257 A former director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, which houses the privacy unit, has called the FTC “woefully understaffed.”258 As of the spring of 2019, the FTC had only forty employees dedicated to privacy and data security, compared to 500 and 110 employees at comparable agencies in the UK. and Ireland, respectively.259 Without more lawyers, investigators, and technologists, the FTC will be forced to conduct privacy investigations less thoroughly, and in some cases, forgo them altogether.260 Currently, the FT C’s resources are spread thin across multiple missions, to the detriment of its privacy efforts. Removing the agency’s antitrust responsibilities would reallocate resources from the antitrust department to its privacy unit and other areas of consumer protection. Further, it would free up the scarce time of the commissioners to oversee this essential effort.261

#### Unchecked algorithmic bias risks massive inequality and extinction.

Mike Thomas 20. Quoting AI experts including MIT Physics Professors, Senior Features Writer for BuiltIn. THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: 7 ways AI can change the world for better ... or worse, Updated: April 20, 2020, <https://builtin.com/artificial-intelligence/artificial-intelligence-future>

Klabjan also puts little stock in extreme scenarios — the type involving, say, murderous cyborgs that turn the earth into a smoldering hellscape. He’s much more concerned with machines — war robots, for instance — being fed faulty “incentives” by nefarious humans. As MIT physics professors and leading AI researcher Max Tegmark put it in a 2018 TED Talk, “The real threat from AI isn’t malice, like in silly Hollywood movies, but competence — AI accomplishing goals that just aren’t aligned with ours.” That’s Laird’s take, too. “I definitely don’t see the scenario where something wakes up and decides it wants to take over the world,” he says. “I think that’s science fiction and not the way it’s going to play out.” What Laird worries most about isn’t evil AI, per se, but “evil humans using AI as a sort of false force multiplier” for things like bank robbery and credit card fraud, among many other crimes. And so, while he’s often frustrated with the pace of progress, AI’s slow burn may actually be a blessing. “Time to understand what we’re creating and how we’re going to incorporate it into society,” Laird says, “might be exactly what we need.” But no one knows for sure. “There are several major breakthroughs that have to occur, and those could come very quickly,” Russell said during his Westminster talk. Referencing the rapid transformational effect of nuclear fission (atom splitting) by British physicist Ernest Rutherford in 1917, he added, “It’s very, very hard to predict when these conceptual breakthroughs are going to happen.” But whenever they do, if they do, he emphasized the importance of preparation. That means starting or continuing discussions about the ethical use of A.G.I. and whether it should be regulated. That means working to eliminate data bias, which has a corrupting effect on algorithms and is currently a fat fly in the AI ointment. That means working to invent and augment security measures capable of keeping the technology in check. And it means having the humility to realize that just because we can doesn’t mean we should. “Our situation with technology is complicated, but the big picture is rather simple,” Tegmark said during his TED Talk. “Most AGI researchers expect AGI within decades, and if we just bumble into this unprepared, it will probably be the biggest mistake in human history. It could enable brutal global dictatorship with unprecedented inequality, surveillance, suffering and maybe even human extinction. But if we steer carefully, we could end up in a fantastic future where everybody’s better off—the poor are richer, the rich are richer, everybody’s healthy and free to live out their dreams.”

### cap

#### Affect Link – focus on post-nuclear forces like a structure of feeling reduces labor and being in common to creative, spiritual relations beyond the concrete – this displacement of materialism and expansion of feeling is inseparable from compassionate capitalism that amplifies alienation of labor and tricks the masses into mass exodus from institutions which occupy centers of power

Cotter 16 – Professor of English at William Jewell [Jennifer, “The New Class Common-Sense: Biopolitics, Posthumanism, and Love,” in Cotter, K. DeFazio, R. Faivre, A. Sahay, J. Torrant, S. Tumino, &, R. Wilkie (eds.) *All Too (Post)Human: The Humanities after Humanism*, Lexington Books, pp. 25-32]

The return in contemporary cultural theory to focus on questions of "love" and "affect" is an articulation of the fact that love is a social emotion and an integral part of culture that is useful for reproducing the social relations of production. Love, and different forms of love, therefore becomes a site of conflict and struggle in cultural theory and in daily life precisely because of the relation of love to material relations. This relation continues today: as class contradictions in capitalism have intensified and more family members have been pulled into the wage-work force, capital also puts pressure on the nuclear-family form insofar as it has begun to serve as a barrier for capital to extract more surplus-labor from the existing workforce. As a consequence a "new" flexible, "post-nuclear," and "posthuman" -but not post-class-sexual and moral code of love is emerging. The old morality of love is serving as a hindrance in many cases to the intensification of the exploitation of workers' surplus-labor around the world. The new spiritualism of "love" -in both its biopolitical and transspecies posthumanist variations -is at root an ideological purging of "old" moral codes of love and sexuality once useful to the ruling class during an earlier stage in the development of capitalism and bringing about new moral codes of love and sexuality useful for adjusting workers to the intensification of class contradictions in transnational capitalism now. And yet, biopolitical theories of love ideologically invert the relationship of these new "post-nuclear" and "post-human" moral codes of love to the material relations of production and posit new forms of love as themselves constituting new material relations in society. In concealing the relationship of love to class relations and diverting attention away from the need to transform the material relations of production, these spiritualist theories of love also conceal the fact that the "new" "post-nuclear" forms of love and sexuality they promote are not a break from capitalist relations of production, but an updating of its social relations of reproduction to adjust workers to the intensification of class contradictions now.

In the discourses of biopolitics, love is abstracted from its relation to the material relations of production and grasped primarily as a transsocial affective and spiritual "life force" that "creates" and brings into being new social forms. Love is "spiritualized." It is represented as a "creative life force" that will heal social alienation in capitalism -which has its origin in the material contradictions of production in capitalism - without actually transforming the material relations of production founded on exploitation. For example, in Commonwealth Hardt and Negri argue that "love" is a "biopolitical event" that "produces the common." 38 In other words, their claim is that love brings about new social relations that break from private property and bring about a "commonwealth." To understand their claims about "love as a biopolitical event" that brings about a change in material relations, it is first necessary to understand what Hardt and Negri mean by "biopolitics." Drawing on Foucault's theory of biopower, they make a distinction between "biopower" and "biopolitics." Hardt and Negri deploy the concept of "biopower" to refer to the "disciplinary regimes, architectures of power, and the applications of power through distributed and capillary networks" that are the subject of Foucault's investigations and that he argues do not "repress" but "produce" subjectivities. 39 Hardt and Negri point out that "biopower," although considered by Foucault to be productive of subjectivities rather than "repressive" of pre-existing subjectivities, is nonetheless a concept which discusses regimes of "power over life." 40 By contrast, Hardt and Negri use another term, "biopolitics," to refer to what they regard as "the other to power (or even an other power)." 41 They contend that "there is always a minor current that insists on life as resistance, an other power of life that strives toward an alternative existence." 42 In other words, in contrast to "biopower" which is "power over life," "biopolitics," in Hardt and Negri' s theorization of it, is the "power of life" and, more specifically, the "power of life to resist and determine an alternative production of subjectivity" which "not only resists power but also seeks autonomy from it." 43 Hardt and Negri not only understand "biopolitics" as a striving toward autonomy, but as having an autonomous origin that transcends the historical and material relations of society: "the biopower against which we struggle is not comparable in its nature to the form of power by which we defend and seek our freedom." 44

"Biopolitics" -as Hardt and Negri understand it as the "power of life to resist" -is at root a theory of "creative life force," or what Spinoza calls potenza and Hemi Bergson calls elan vital, which has its philosophical roots in spiritual creationisms. "Biopolitics" with its reliance on an autonomous "power of life" to "resist" is a spiritualizing of the dialectical praxis of labor and an erasure of the material relations of production. It translates what Marx calls the "dialectical praxis of labor" into spiritualist terms by abstracting "life" from its material conditions of possibility and ideologically converting productive activity or labor-which exists in a necessary relation to the relations of production -into an autonomous "creativity."

The existence of "life," which is to say "the existence of living human individuals," and the "power to resist" presupposes material conditions which can enable and sustain human life. This is the case since men and women "must be in a position to live in order to be able to 'make history"'; they must be in a position to satisfy needs of "eating and drinking [ ... ] habitation, clothing and many other things." 45 In order to satisfy needs to sustain human life, the existence of human life is not only dependent on the means of subsistence, but on labor. Labor is, as Engels puts it, not only the source of all wealth but "next to nature," he argues, "it is the prime basic condition for all human existence." 46 There is no "human existence" that is prior to labor and labor is itself not outside of history; it is a dialectical and material relation:

Labour is, first of all, a process between man and nature, a process by which man, through his own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between himself and nature. He confronts the materials of nature as a force of nature. He sets in motion the natural forces which belong to his own body, his arms, legs, head and hands, in order to appropriate the materials of nature in a form adapted to his own needs. Through this movement he acts upon external nature and changes it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his own nature. 47

The existence of human "life" and its course of development never exists independently of the material conditions of production prevailing at the time (the forces of production) and the social relations within which this production takes place (the relations of production or property relations). And these conditions and relations are themselves the product of past labor and, in tum, shape the course of all other aspects of social life. But labor conditions never remain static: as the forces of production develop this results in the production and satisfaction of new needs which come into direct contradiction with the relations of production, requiring transformation in the relations of production. Human existence is not prior to the social "metabolism" between the forces of production and the relations within which this production takes place and are transformed. As Marx and Engels argue,

The fact is, therefore, that definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into these definite social and political relations[ ... ] [T]he social structure and the state are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite individuals, however, of these individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other people's imaginations, but as they actually are, i.e., as they act, produce materially, and hence as they work under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions, independent of their will. 48

Biopolitics, by abstracting life from the material relations of production and the dialectical praxis of labor, puts forward an understanding of the "power of life" as limitless. In erasing the relation of necessity between "life" and the dialectical praxis of labor, one of the goals of biopolitics and its ideological renewing of spiritual creationism is, as I discuss further below, to update the contemporary workforces of capitalism to increase their productivity (under the banner of the "power of life") without eradicating exploitation in production. Raising productivity without eradicating exploitation means raising the rate of exploitation of workers with the aim of raising the rate of profit for capital.

#### The oppression of women is not the ahistorical products an abstract system of patriarchy – it’s the historical product of the emergence of a classed society founded on the logic of surplus accumulation – The shift from necessity to surplus transformed division of labor into a tool to concentrate wealth and power over women

Cloud 3—Professor of Communication at UT Austin

(Dana, *“Marxism and Oppression,”* talk for Regional Socialist Conference, April 19, 2003)

In order **to challenge oppression**, **it is important to know where it comes from**. **Historians, archaeologists, and anthropologists tell us that in pre-class societies** such as hunter-gatherer societies, racism and **sexism** **were unheard of**. Because homosexuality was not an identifiable category of such societies, discrimination on that basis did not occur either. In fact, it is clear that racism, **sexism**, and homophobia have **arisen in particular kinds of societies**, namely **class societies**. **Women’s oppression originated in** the first **class societies**, while racism came into prominence in the early periods of capitalism when colonialism and slavery drove the economic system. The prohibition against gays and lesbians is a relatively modern phenomenon. But what all forms of **oppression** have in common is that they **did not always exist and are not endemic to human nature**. **They were created in the interest of ruling classes in society** and continue to benefit the people at the top of society, while dividing and conquering the rest of us so as to weaken the common fight against the oppressors. The work of Marx’s collaborator Friederich Engels on The Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State in some respects reflects the Victorian times in which in was written. Engels moralizes about women’s sexuality and doesn’t even include gay and lesbian liberation in his discussion of the oppressive family. However, **anthropologists** like the feminist Rayna Reiter have **confirmed** his most important and central argument that **it was in the first settled agricultural societies that women became an oppressed class**. **In societies where** for the first time **people could accumulate** a **surplus** of food and other resources, **it was possible** for some people **to hoard wealth and control** its **distribution**. The first governments or state structures formed to legitimate an emerging ruling class. **As** settled **communities** grew in size and **became** **more complex social organizations**, and, most importantly, **as** the **surplus grew**, **the distribution of wealth became unequal**—and a small number of men rose above the rest of the population in wealth and power. **In** the previous **hunter-gatherer societies, there had been a sexual division of labor, but one without a hierarchy of value**. **There was no** strict **demarcation between** the **reproductive and productive spheres**. All of **that changed with** the development of **private property** in more settled communities. **The** **earlier division of labor in which men did the heavier work, hunting, and animal agriculture, became a system of differential control over resource distribution**. **The new system required more** field **workers and sought to maximize women’s reproductive potential.** **Production shifted away from the household over time and women became associated with the reproductive role, losing control over the production and distribution of the necessities of life**. **It was not** a matter of male **sexism, but** of **economic priorities** of a developing class system. This is why Engels identifies women’s oppression as the first form of systematic class oppression in the world. **Marxists** since Engels **have not dismissed the oppression of women** as secondary to other kinds of oppression and exploitation. To the contrary, **women’s oppression has a primary place in Marxist analysis** and is a key issue that socialists organize around today. From this history we know that **sexism did not always** **exist**, **and** that **men do not have an inherent interest in oppressing women** as domestic servants or sexual slaves. Instead, **women’s oppression** always has **served a class hierarchy** in society. In our society divided by sexism, **ideas about women’s** **nature as** domestic caretakers or **irrational** sexual beings **justify** **paying women lower wages** compared to men, so that employers can pit workers against one another in competition for the same work. Most women have always had to work outside the home to support their families. Today, **women** around the world **are** **exploited in sweatshops** where their status as women allows bosses to pay them very little, **driving down the wages** of both men and women. At the same time, **capitalist society relies on ideas about women to justify not providing** very much in the way of **social services** that would help provide health care, family leave, unemployment insurance, access to primary and higher education, and so forth—all because **these things** are supposed to **happen in the private family, where women are responsible**. This lack of social support results in a lower quality of life for many men as well as women. Finally, **contemporary ideologies** that **pit men against women encourage us to fight each other rather than organizing together.**

#### As long as capitalism exists it will sustain patriarchy. Regardless of which came first, capitalism’s continued existance necessitates oppressive gender roles, the nuclear family, and wage gaps to provide cheap labor – makes their impacts inevitable and turns case

\*\*\*gender modified

Smith 94—author of Women and Socialism: Essays on Women’s Liberation (Haymarket Books, 2005), her writings appear regularly in Socialist Worker newspaper and the ISR

(Sharon, *“Mistaken identity--or can identity politics liberate the oppressed?,”* in the *INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM JOURNAL*, Issue 62, Spring 1994, http://pubs.socialistreviewindex.org.uk/isj62/smith.htm)

The period after the introduction of the Jim Crow segregation laws in the Southern US at the turn of the century illustrates this dynamic perfectly. Far from benefiting from the extreme level of racism brought about by Jim Crow, Southern white workers suffered wages lower than those of black workers in the North.99 Whenever capitalists can threaten to replace one group of workers with another, poorly paid, group of workers, neither group benefits. The only beneficiaries of this inequality are within the ruling class, who pay lower wages overall. The same relationship holds between the wages of men and those of wom[y]n workers, which tend to be lower. In the US wom[y]n's wages tend to hover at between 60 and 70 percent of men's. But this has the net effect of depressing men's wages, for they are made constantly aware that, if their own wage demands aim too high, they can be replaced with cheaper wom[y]n workers. For example, the formerly male occupation of clerical work is now dominated by lower paid wom[y]n workers. The effect of special oppression is to increase the level of oppression for the working class overall.  Besides this aspect, however, **the oppression of wom[y]n** and gays **involves another** key **feature of the capitalist system**: the role of **the nuclear family.** The nuclear family first **grew up hand in hand with the development of class society**. During the early flourishing of industrial capitalism low wages forced entire working class families to work in factories in order to survive. This severely undermined the working class family to the point of threatening its existence. Indeed, Marx and Engels (mistakenly) believed that the working class family was disappearing under capitalism. But from the mid-19th century onwards, the trend was toward consolidation of the family: wages rose enough so that more working class wom[y]n would remain within the home and make childrearing a priority.  The modern working class family developed as part of the superstructure, first and foremost to provide the system with a plentiful supply of labour. The working class family developed as a cheap way to reproduce labour power for capitalism, both in terms of replenishing the daily strength of the current labour force and also as a way of raising future generations of workers through adulthood. Capitalists have come to rely upon 'privatised reproduction', as Marx called it. It is doubtful at this point that capitalism could do without the family.  Engels argued that the role of the 'proletarian wife' meant 'the wife became the head servant... if she carries out her duties in the private service of her family, she remains excluded from public production and unable to earn; and if she wants to take part in public production and earn independently, she cannot carry out her family duties.'100 **I**n order to prop up the family, ruling class ideology compels both **wom[y]n and men to adhere to rigidly demarcated sex roles**--the ideal of homemaker for wom[y]n, subordinate to the family's male breadwinner--regardless of how little these ideals actually reflect the real lives of working class people.  An essential component of bourgeois ideology around the family is the portrayal of human sexuality as 'naturally' heterosexual and monogamous. This aspect of the ideology of the family is so essential, in fact, that the very existence of lesbians and gays who choose to live outside the traditional nuclear family poses a threat to it. Therefore, laws governing sexual behaviour and explicitly defining homosexuality as 'deviant' began to appear in the late 19th century.  Unless one understands the family's role in privatised reproduction for capitalism, it can seem as if the personal relationships themselves which exist inside the family produce oppression, particularly of wom[y]n. Inequality between wom[y]n and men does exist within the family, in that wom[y]n take much more responsibility for housework and childcare than men. But the **unpaid labour wom[y]n perform inside the family is labour which benefits only the ruling class. Working class men have no objective interest in maintaining the role of the nuclear family** as it exists under capitalism, **for it places the entire burden of reproduction onto the shoulders of** workers.

Working class men also have an interest in a system in which housework is socialised and quality childcare is available whenever it is needed.  Some feminists in particular reject the Marxist view that the family is part of the superstructure, claiming that this downplays the importance of the personal aspects of wom[y]n's oppression. But the Marxist view simply locates the source of all aspects of wom[y]n's oppression as flowing from the needs of class society. This does not mean that Marxists disregard the personal aspects of wom[y]n's oppression or of any other form of oppression. Since Marx and Engels, Marxists have understood that privatised reproduction through the nuclear family must be ended in order to end sexual oppression and to create the material conditions in which wom[y]n and men can truly be equals in their personal lives. Engels himself said, in a passage from The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State:   **What we can** now **conjecture about** the way in which **sexual relations** will be ordered **after the** impending **overthrow of capitalist production is** mainly of a negative character, limited for the most part to **what will disappear.** But **what will there be new? That will be answered when a new generation has grown up: a generation of men who never** in their lives **have known what it is to buy a woman's surrender with money** or any other social instrument of power; **a generation of wom[y]n who have never known what it is to** give themselves to a man from any other considerations than real love or to **refuse to give themselves to their lover from fear of the economic consequences**. When these people are in the world, they will care precious little what anybody today thinks they ought to do; they will make their own practice and their corresponding public opinion about the practice of each individual--and that will be the end of it.101  Nor have Marxists underestimated the degree of inequality which exists between wom[y]n and men in the family. Leon Trotsky once wrote, 'In order to change the conditions of life, we must learn to see them through the eyes of wom[y]n.' Furthermore, Trotsky argued that,   in order to achieve the actual equality of man and woman within the family is an... arduous problem. All our domestic habits must be revolutionised before that can happen. And yet it is quite obvious that unless there is actual equality of husband and wife in the family, in a normal sense as well as in the conditions of life, we cannot speak seriously of their equality in social work or even in politics.102  **Rather than downplaying oppression**, then, **the emphasis by Marxists on the class nature of oppression leads to an understanding that capitalism must be overthrown in order** to end it. Moreover, locating the root of oppression in class society explains why the working class has an interest in ending oppression in all its forms.

## case

### at: debate = monopoly---1nc

#### debate’s not a monopoly---k v. policy growth, future trajectories, flex debaters, and non-dominant schools like liberty winning tons of debates prove

### presumption---1nc

#### presumption---they don’t have a reason they get rid of patriarchal root cause in debate---sexual violence, poor pay, unequal distribution of success etc. remain---aff’s resiliency strategy is insufficient

### at: state bad---1nc

#### state’s key to enact the aff---otherwise they cause hyper-individualizing which is bad

Fraser 13 [Nancy Fraser, Professor of philosophy and politics at the New School for Social Research in New York. An Einstein fellow at the John F Kennedy Institute of the Free University of Berlin, she also holds the chair in global justice at the Collège d'Etudes Mondiales, Paris. In winter 2014, she will be visiting professor of gender studies at Cambridge University. Her most recent book is Fortunes of Feminism: From State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis. October 13th, 2013, How feminism became capitalism's handmaiden - and how to reclaim it. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/14/feminism-capitalist-handmaiden-neoliberal//RSoni]

As a feminist, I've always assumed that by fighting to emancipate women I was building a better world – more egalitarian, just and free. But lately I've begun to worry that ideals pioneered by feminists are serving quite different ends. I worry, specifically, that our critique of sexism is now supplying the justification for new forms of inequality and exploitation. In a cruel twist of fate, I fear that the movement for women's liberation has become entangled in a dangerous liaison with neoliberal efforts to build a free-market society. That would explain how it came to pass that feminist ideas that once formed part of a radical worldview are increasingly expressed in individualist terms. Where feminists once criticised a society that promoted careerism, they now advise women to "lean in". A movement that once prioritised social solidarity now celebrates female entrepreneurs. A perspective that once valorised "care" and interdependence now encourages individual advancement and meritocracy. What lies behind this shift is a sea-change in the character of capitalism. The state-managed capitalism of the postwar era has given way to a new form of capitalism – "disorganised", globalising, neoliberal. Second-wave feminism emerged as a critique of the first but has become the handmaiden of the second. With the benefit of hindsight, we can now see that the movement for women's liberation pointed simultaneously to two different possible futures. In a first scenario, it prefigured a world in which gender emancipation went hand in hand with participatory democracy and social solidarity; in a second, it promised a new form of liberalism, able to grant women as well as men the goods of individual autonomy, increased choice, and meritocratic advancement. Second-wave feminism was in this sense ambivalent. Compatible with either of two different visions of society, it was susceptible to two different historical elaborations. As I see it, feminism's ambivalence has been resolved in recent years in favour of the second, liberal-individualist scenario – but not because we were passive victims of neoliberal seductions. On the contrary, we ourselves contributed three important ideas to this development. One contribution was our critique of the "family wage": the ideal of a male breadwinner-female homemaker family that was central to state-organised capitalism. Feminist criticism of that ideal now serves to legitimate "flexible capitalism". After all, this form of capitalism relies heavily on women's waged labour, especially low-waged work in service and manufacturing, performed not only by young single women but also by married women and women with children; not by only racialised women, but by women of virtually all nationalities and ethnicities. As women have poured into labour markets around the globe, state-organised capitalism's ideal of the family wage is being replaced by the newer, more modern norm – apparently sanctioned by feminism – of the two-earner family. Never mind that the reality that underlies the new ideal is depressed wage levels, decreased job security, declining living standards, a steep rise in the number of hours worked for wages per household, exacerbation of the double shift – now often a triple or quadruple shift – and a rise in poverty, increasingly concentrated in female-headed households. Neoliberalism turns a sow's ear into a silk purse by elaborating a narrative of female empowerment. Invoking the feminist critique of the family wage to justify exploitation, it harnesses the dream of women's emancipation to the engine of capital accumulation. Feminism has also made a second contribution to the neoliberal ethos. In the era of state-organised capitalism, we rightly criticised a constricted political vision that was so intently focused on class inequality that it could not see such "non-economic" injustices as domestic violence, sexual assault and reproductive oppression. Rejecting "economism" and politicising "the personal", feminists broadened the political agenda to challenge status hierarchies premised on cultural constructions of gender difference. The result should have been to expand the struggle for justice to encompass both culture and economics. But the actual result was a one-sided focus on "gender identity" at the expense of bread and butter issues. Worse still, the feminist turn to identity politics dovetailed all too neatly with a rising neoliberalism that wanted nothing more than to repress all memory of social equality. In effect, we absolutised the critique of cultural sexism at precisely the moment when circumstances required redoubled attention to the critique of political economy. Finally, feminism contributed a third idea to neoliberalism: the critique of welfare-state paternalism. Undeniably progressive in the era of state-organised capitalism, that critique has since converged with neoliberalism's war on "the nanny state" and its more recent cynical embrace of NGOs. A telling example is "microcredit", the programme of small bank loans to poor women in the global south. Cast as an empowering, bottom-up alternative to the top-down, bureaucratic red tape of state projects, microcredit is touted as the feminist antidote for women's poverty and subjection. What has been missed, however, is a disturbing coincidence: microcredit has burgeoned just as states have abandoned macro-structural efforts to fight poverty, efforts that small-scale lending cannot possibly replace. In this case too, then, a feminist idea has been recuperated by neoliberalism. A perspective aimed originally at democratising state power in order to empower citizens is now used to legitimise marketisation and state retrenchment. In all these cases, feminism's ambivalence has been resolved in favour of (neo)liberal individualism. But the other, solidaristic scenario may still be alive. The current crisis affords the chance to pick up its thread once more, reconnecting the dream of women's liberation with the vision of a solidary society. To that end, feminists need to break off our dangerous liaison with neoliberalism and reclaim our three "contributions" for our own ends. First, we might break the spurious link between our critique of the family wage and flexible capitalism by militating for a form of life that de-centres waged work and valorises unwaged activities, including – but not only – carework. Second, we might disrupt the passage from our critique of economism to identity politics by integrating the struggle to transform a status order premised on masculinist cultural values with the struggle for economic justice. Finally, we might sever the bogus bond between our critique of bureaucracy and free-market fundamentalism by reclaiming the mantle of participatory democracy as a means of strengthening the public powers needed to constrain capital for the sake of justice.

### analytic stuff---1nc

#### their method is bad---perscribes sexuality as a solution for social ills---3 disads:

#### 1---coercion---people who practice things that are against sex work are left out of the community---causes affect disruption and kills critical mass

#### 2---commodification---deifying sex work is bad---causes people like bella thorne in the debate space

#### 3---triggering---some people don’t want to think about sex work because of bad interpersonal experiences---makes it impossible to actualize

### their method bad---1nc

#### even positive affirmation of agency in the face of gender violence in debate creates a narrative of resilience that justifies neoliberal victim blaming – turns case

Rodier and Meagher 14 (Kristin – PhD Candidate at the University of Alberta in the Department of Philosophy, and Michelle – Associate Professor of Women’s and Gender Studies at the University of Alberta, “In Her Own Time: Rihanna, Post-Feminism, and Domestic Violence,” Women: A Cultural Review 25(2):176-193, accessed 2-8-15 //Bosley)

Susan J. Douglas (2010) argues that popular culture is a site where issues identified as points of concern for feminist activists may be explored on a broad cultural level. Television viewers, for instance, are exposed to and asked to reflect upon sexual assault and domestic violence, rape and unplanned pregnancy, sexism and racism in the workplace and in social institutions. But much of the treatment of these issues occurs at arm's length from feminist analysis. This is most certainly the case with narratives of violence against women in popular culture. Using the example of the very public discussion of violence in the wake of American R&B singer Chris Brown's abuse of Rihanna, a Barbadian R&B singer, we argue that efforts to make domestic violence ‘part of the discourse of society’, to use Oprah Winfrey's language (Winfrey 2009b), have been undermined by parallel demands to behave as a neoliberal and post-feminist subject who is encouraged to create for herself a future that does not include violence and abuse. In February 2009, international pop music sensation Rihanna was the victim of violence at the hands of her then-boyfriend Chris Brown. The unauthorized disclosure of police photographs of Rihanna's battered face and the wide circulation of the police report describing the violent attack became opportunities for American journalists and public figures to encourage women to recognize signs of violence in their own relationships and to remove themselves from sites of abuse. On the surface, such responses suggest the widespread success of feminist efforts to combat gender-based violence in domestic settings. Yet, although there are benefits to public attention to domestic violence, reportage on the Rihanna-Brown case often failed to reveal the widespread and entrenched sexism that produces and justifies domestic violence. In this paper we argue that the inadequacy of so many responses reveals that neoliberal and postfeminist articulations of gender-based violence rely on problematic temporal imperatives meant to bolster women's agency. We examine how neoliberal and post-feminist constructions of agency and temporality undermine the feminist politics of violence against women by asking young women to take on the responsibility of negotiating their imagined futures, and portraying agency as limitless and self-transformation as instantaneous. Finally, we identify how these discourses intensify norms of self-care and resilience in the face of adversity. In section one we describe the attack on Rihanna by Chris Brown and the media attention that ensued. We give a sketch of feminist scholars’ reflection on the incident and the media responses. In section two, we define neoliberalism and post-feminism, and draw out some of their racial and temporal implications. In section three we discuss media mogul and talk show host Oprah Winfrey's very public advice to Rihanna immediately following the news of Chris Brown's indictment. We argue that her advice functions to make Rihanna herself responsible for her predicament—and victims of domestic violence more broadly—through a mobilization of temporal norms of self-care and self-improvement. In section four we analyse Rihanna's interview with Diane Sawyer almost nine months after the incident of violence. Back on track, Rihanna describes how she is taking care and moving forward. In section five, we discuss how the temporal norms that thrust responsibility on to Rihanna not only ask that she take care of herself, but that she protect other future potential victims. Ultimately, in this paper, we challenge the deployment of temporal norms that make victims of violence themselves responsible for their experiences.

#### The AFF’s project of ethical identification and politicization of violence reifies a victim economy whereby academics make the suffering body dance for our enjoyment, vampirically draining it of all life and objectifying it for advancement.

**Berlant 98** (Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, “Poor Eliza,” American Literature, Vol. 70, No. 3, No More Separate Spheres! (Sep., 1998), Duke University Press, pg. 635-668, rmf) \*modified for gendered language using brackets

What distinguishes these critical texts are the startling ways they struggle to encounter the Uncle Tom form without reproducing it, declining to pay the inheritance tax. The postsentimental does not involve an aesthetic disruption to the contract sentimentality makes between its texts and readers -that proper reading will lead to better feeling and therefore to a better self. What changes is the place of repetition in this contract, a crisis frequently thematized in formal aesthetic and generational terms. In its traditional and political modalities, the sentimental promises that in a just world a consensus will already exist about what constitutes uplift, amelioration, and emancipation, those horizons toward which empathy powerfully directs itself. Identification with suffering, the ethical response to the sentimental plot, leads to its repetition in the audience and thus to a generally held view about what transformations would bring the good life into being. This presumption, that the terms of consent are transhistorical once true feeling is shared, explains in part why emotions, especially painful ones, are so central to the world-building aspects of sentimental alliance. Postsentimental texts withdraw from the contract that presumes consent to the conventionally desired outcomes of identification and empathy. The desire for unconflictedness might very well motivate the sacrifice of surprising ideas to the norms of the world against which this rhetoric is being deployed. What, if anything, then, can be built from the very different knowledge/experience of subaltern pain? What can memory do to create conditions for freedom and justice without reconfirming the terms of ordinary subordination? More than a critique of feeling as such, the postsentimental modality also challenges what literature and storytelling have come to stand for in the creation of sentimental national subjects across an almost two-century span. Three moments in this genealogy, which differ as much from each other as from the credulous citation of Uncle Tom's Cabin we saw in The King and I and Dimples, will mark here some potential within the arsenal that counters the repetition compulsions of sentimentality. This essay began with a famous passage from James Baldwin's "Everybody's Protest Novel," a much-cited essay about Uncle Tom's Cabin that is rarely read in the strong sense because its powerful language of rageful truth-telling would shame in advance any desire to make claims for the tactical efficacy of suffering and mourning in the struggle to transform the United States into a postracist nation. I cited Baldwin's text to open this piece not to endorse its absolute truth but to figure its frustrated opposition to the sentimental optimism that equates the formal achievement of empathy on a mass scale with the general project of democracy Baldwin's special contribution to what sentimentality can mean has been lost in the social-problemachinery of mass society, in which the production of tears where anger or nothing might have been became more urgent with the coming to cultural dominance of the Holocaust and trauma as models for having and remembering collective social experience.20 Currently, as in traditional sentimentality, the authenticity of overwhelming pain that can be textually performed and shared is disseminated as a prophylactic against the reproduction of a shocking and numbing mass violence. Baldwin asserts that the overvaluation of such redemptive feeling is precisely a condition of that violence. Baldwin's encounter with Stowe in this essay comes amidst a general wave of protest novels, social-problem films, and film noir in the U.S. after World War Two: Gentleman's Agreement, The Postman Always Rings Twice, The Best Years of Our Lives. Films like these, he says, "emerge for what they are: a mirror of our confusion, dishonesty, panic, trapped and immobilized in the sunlit prison of the American dream." They cut the complexity of human motives and self-understanding "down to size" by preferring "a lie more palatable than the truth" about the social and material effects the liberal pedagogy of optimism has, or doesn't have, on "[hu]man's" capacity to produce a world of authentic truth, justice, and freedom.21 Indeed, "truth" is the keyword for Baldwin. He defines it as "a devotion to the human being, his [or her] freedom and fulfillment: freedom which cannot be legislated, fulfillment which cannot be charted."22 In contrast, Stowe's totalitarian religiosity, her insistence that subjects "bargain" for heavenly redemption with their own physical and spiritual mortification, merely and violently confirms the fundamental abjection of all persons, especially the black ones who wear the dark night of the soul out where all can see it. Additionally, Baldwin argues that Uncle Tom's Cabin instantiates a tradition of locating the destiny of the nation in a false model of the individual soul, one imagined as free of ambivalence, aggression, or contradiction. By "human being" Baldwin means to repudiate stock identities as such, arguing that their stark simplicity confirms the very fantasies and institutions against which the sentimental is ostensibly being mobilized. This national-liberal refusal of complexity is what he elsewhere calls "the price of the ticket" for membership in the American dream.23 As the Uncle Tom films suggest, whites need blacks to "dance" for them so that they might continue’’’’

# 2nc---northwestern r2

## k

#### 4 – turns case – Black feminist erotics are impossible if your life and material conditions are dominated by corporate leaders---it’s a pre-req to any of their psychic energy offense and means you should strongly err neg

Robinson 14 – Professor of sociology at UC Santa Barbara [William, *Global capitalism and the crisis of humanity*, Cambridge Univ. Press, pp. 222-4]

How viable are transformative strategies based on the notion that local communities can withdraw from global capitalism? The attempt to create alter- native communities at the local level, to set up cooperatives, to decentralize circuits of food supply, to withdraw from the global agro-industrial regime, to decentralize energy distribution and consumption, and to construct cooperative enterprises and local solidarity economies are necessary and important. Yet they do not in themselves resolve the problem of power. In the absence of a strategy to confront the state and to transform the system from within we are left with the dangerous illusion that the world can be changed without resolving this matter of power. Global capitalism is now internal to practically all communities on the planet. It has spun webs of worldwide interdependency that link us all to a larger totality. Global capitalism is indeed totalizing. The notion that one can escape from global capitalism not by defeating it but by creating alternative spaces or islands of utopia ignores the unpleasant fact that no matter how one wills it to be so, these spaces cannot disengage from capitalism, if for no other reason than that capital and the state will penetrate – often forcibly – and continuously reincorporate these spaces.

Localized solutions are too piecemeal to confront the power of global capitalism – to change the global balance of class and social forces. There is no way to get around the fact that the TCC holds class power over humanity, and the TNS exercises multiple forms of direct, coercive power. The state exercises power over us. This fact will not go away by ignoring this power. It is illusory to suppose that it can be countered by constructing autonomous communities, which in fact are not autonomous because such communities cannot extricate themselves from the webs of global capitalism, and even if they could, in theory, the state would not allow them to; it would use the force of its law to reincorporate such communities. There is no getting around confrontation with the state, no avoiding a struggle to wrest state power away from capital, its agents and allies. The struggle to withdraw from global capitalism, no matter how important, must be coupled with a struggle to overthrow global capitalism, to destroy the transnational capitalist state.

#### 2 – Local to Global Bad – the question of this debate is which model translates collectives to overcome commoditization of dissent – the perm that scales up from “local” to “global” gets the direction of causality wrong by mystifying how world economies structure local relations – misdiagnosis turns solvency.

Engel-Di Mauro 9 – Associate Professor of Geography at SUNY New Paltz (Salvatore, “Seeing the local in the global: Political ecologies, world-systems, and the question of scale”, Geoforum (2009):116-125)

Despite the emphasis on multiple scales of analysis, ‘‘webs of relation” (Rocheleau and Roth, 2007), ‘‘chains of explanation” (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987, p. 27), ‘‘bottom-up” (Blaikie, 1985, p. 82), or ‘‘progressive contextualisation” (Vayda, 1983), most of the work in political ecology privileges spatio-temporally limited social contexts over longer-term, macro-scale social processes (Bridge, 2002, p. 371). While this may be the outcome of a recent distancing from political economy perspectives (Brown and Purcell, 2005, p. 611), the problem was inherent from the very beginning, with a tendency to emphasise the ‘‘regional” or meso-scale (and then ‘‘local”, or micro-scale) as the starting unit of analysis. This analytical centring of smaller-scale dynamics has resulted in an inability to integrate general patterns and interconnections with ethnographic and eco- systemic data (Blaikie, 1999, p. 140; Brown and Purcell, 2005, p. 612). This is far from saying that micro- or meso-specificity is less important than macro-specificity (the two are equally important in my view). Micro- and meso-level analysis is pivotal in under- standing people–environment relations, especially given that the most tangible occur largely over small areas. Yet emphasis on the smaller scale becomes a hindrance when it guides, rather than builds the empirical foundations of a research project. With few exceptions, political ecology continues to suffer from a methodological insis- tence on explaining people–environment relations through the analysis of smaller-scale circumstances and/or starting points. Planet-wide environmental and, since at least 500 years ago, social processes enable and/or constrain smaller-scale people–environment relations, especially with recent human-induced shifts in atmosphere composition (radiative forcing through greenhouse gas emissions, stratospheric ozone layer disruption through the emissions of bromines and chlorofluorocarbons, regional releases of atmospheric pollutants through burning vegetation and coal com- bustion, etc.). The scale of analysis adopted in a research project may depend on the kind of question one wishes to answer (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987, p. 65), but ultimately larger-scale processes must be included to arrive at explanations that go beyond appeals to complexity (Blaikie, 1985) or beyond eclecticism in the frameworks being combined (Blaikie, 1999, p. 139). The matter is exacerbated when phenomena in some parts of the whole are confused for evidence that negates either the existence of the entire system (or of any systemic process at all) or denies the possibility of a general theory on resource management (e.g., Black, 1990; Forsyth, 2003). There are other epistemological repercussions from such small locality-specific analyses and small-to-large scale approaches. One is treating places (or regions) as isolatable (often implicitly, by not paying attention to wider systemic processes), which enabled political ecology to circumscribe the range of social and environmental contexts to those far away from most political ecologists’ homes (McCarthy, 2002; Robbins, 2004). The underlying problem was reflected in the exclusion of places outside rural ‘‘third” world areas from the purview of political ecology (countries in the former state-socialist camp are still mostly ignored).2 Recent attention to wealthy industrialised capitalist societies and urban ecosystems is a helpful first step in moving political ecology away from a relatively narrow focus3 and into more promising cross-comparative terrain that can generate more systematic analy- sis (see works guest edited by Heynen and Robbins, 2005; Paulson and Gezon, 2005; Schroeder et al., 2006).

# 1nr

## t-usfg

#### Their ev says antitrust bans unionizing

1ac Moses Moon 21 [moses moon, better known on twitter as thotscholar (and formerly known as femi babylon) is a sex intellectual, guerilla eroticist, hoodoo-American conjurer, and low end theorist. she is a cofounder of the Disabled Sex Workers Coalition, and a board member at SWOP, 3-16-2021, "Symposium Introduction: Sex Workers’ Rights, Advocacy, and Organizing – Columbia Human Rights Law Review," No Publication, http://hrlr.law.columbia.edu/hrlr/introduction-sex-workers-rights-advocacy-and-organizing/]//comradeken

It is often intimated that tragedy naturally follows whoredom. In actuality, violence in the sex trade and related industries is usually indicative of power differentials—mainly structural sexism and racism—and legislation that seeks to impede sexual and pleasure-seeking behavior and monetary compensation for, or material consumption of, said intimate labor.[1] On March 16, 2021, eight East Asian massage-parlor workers and bystanders were murdered by a twenty-one-year-old white supremacist gunman named Robert Aaron Long.[2] Long targeted three different Atlanta-based spas—two of which were allegedly listed on an erotic review site as “illicit massage businesses.”[3]

Massage spas are stigmatized and criminalized throughout the United States based on the assumptions that they are places where one can receive sexual services from Asian women or where exploited immigrant women are held against their will.[4] It was within this context that Long allegedly claimed that the killings were not racially motivated, but were instead a result of his desire to purge himself of a “sex addiction.”[5] In Discriminating Sex: White Leisure and the Making of the American Oriental, Amy Sueyoshi wrote that in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, “Public-health officials constructed the Chinese syphilitic prostitute as particularly dangerous only after they discovered that white men also visited Chinese women for sex—so much so, officials legislated the 1875 Page Law that barred the entry of ‘immoral women’ specifically for the Chinese.”[6] Although one must be wary of labeling massage spa laborers as “sex workers,” the triadic connection between race, sex, and perceived occupation was almost certainly a factor in the violence at the Atlanta spas. Yves Nguyen of Red Canary Song, a New York City organization that supports Asian sex workers and allies, drew this connection in their statement on the violence.[7] She stated that the violence at the Atlanta spas was “part of a history of race and gender-based violence against Asian women, immigrants and sex workers” and that “whether the women victims provided sex services is beside the point.”[8] Racialized misogyny insists that East Asian women are demure, tempestuous, fetishistic objects of desire.[9] Roslyn Talusan, a cultural critic, highlighted the insidious nature of racialized misogyny, saying “it’s both impossible and dishonest to ignore how Orientalist misogyny factors into the mass shooting in Atlanta. Asian women have historically been exoticized in America, portrayed as delicate, submissive ‘Lotus Flowers’ or hypersexual and manipulative ‘Dragon Ladies.’”[10] Anti-Asian bigotry has spiked since the inception of the coronavirus pandemic, affecting both Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders nationwide.[11] Last year, former President Trump provoked sinophobia by repeatedly calling the coronavirus the “Chinese virus.”[12] Furthermore, racialized, gendered violence against sex workers is both historic and ongoing, heightened by the stigma caused by modern laws.

Reports show that prostitution stings had previously targeted at least one of the spas the gunman attacked.[13] Over the past several years, multiple new federal policies have targeted sex workers and erotic laborers while purporting to be related to eradicating (child) sex trafficking.[14] These changes have included an increase in “trafficking” stings at workplaces such as massage parlors, carried out to arrest and charge women with prostitution, while ultimately levying no trafficking charges.[15] They have also included legislation such as FOSTA/SESTA, which supposedly rests on the rationale that shutting down offensive websites will prevent traffickers from exploiting victims, including (white) children and youth.[16] Such measures are often met with rightful skepticism because, historically, laws have criminalized, rather than protected, trafficking victims. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA) defines any and all commercial sex trading by minors as trafficking: “there is no requirement to prove that force, fraud, or coercion was used to secure the victim’s actions if the victim is a minor.”[17] Despite this, “[o]nly four states—California, Connecticut, or Florida and Minnesota—have enacted non-criminalization laws that are designed to prevent the arrest and detention, as well as prosecution, of minors for prostitution offenses in addition to connecting child sex trafficking victims with holistic, specialized care and services.”[18] This means that many youth in the sex trade—including minors—are not fully protected by the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) or Safe Harbor laws.

Women and girls of color, including the trafficking victims whom the criminalization of sex work purportedly “saves,” are disproportionately targeted and criminalized by law enforcement, which fails to protect them from the racist and gendered violence they commonly experience while engaging in “survival sex” or other forms of sex work. Minors, particularly Black girls, are still being arrested on charges of prostitution in certain states and criminalized when they defend themselves against sexual violence. An article by Cherice Hopkins for Campaign for Youth Justice states that “girls of color account for 22% of the youth population, but 66% of incarcerated girls . . . . In 2017, Black children accounted for 52% of juvenile prostitution arrests and girls accounted for 61% of prostitution arrests.”[19] Many of these youths are homeless, former victims of abuse, or runaways engaging in “survival sex,” i.e., trading sex for basic resources or other material goods.[20] For example, Chrystul Kizer was arrested at age seventeen after she confessed to killing Randy Volar, a thirty-four-year-old white man who had sexually abused her after responding to a website ad when she was sixteen.[21] Volar had a record of past child sexual abuse, and had a record of abusing underage Black girls.[22] Kizer was charged with first-degree intentional homicide, which carries a mandatory life sentence in Wisconsin. As of this writing, she is currently still awaiting trial.[23] Similarly, Cyntoia Brown, a homeless runaway described as a “teen prostitute,” was convicted in 2004 of killing a man who solicited her for sex. Brown was tried as an adult under Tennessee law, and sentenced to life imprisonment.[24] She was subsequently granted clemency after activists and celebrities rallied behind her.[25] The cases of Kizer and Brown are just two examples of countless ways that the policing of sex work hurts victims more than it helps them.

The precarious position of sex workers has only been exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic, which has caused a national and global economic struggle for many. Erotic laborers, especially sex workers, typically have a difficult time accessing government aid. Women, LGBTQ+ people, poor people, and nonwhite/Black sex workers are particularly affected, because socioeconomic inequalities are compounded in this mostly underground industry.[26] Last year the United States government approved the $2.2 trillion dollar CARES Act to provide assistance for small businesses, independent contractors, and sole proprietors via Small Business Administration (SBA) loans and the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP).[27] However, “businesses that provide services or live performances of a ‘prurient sexual nature’ are banned from receiving SBA loans under federal regulations.”[28] This move left many erotic laborers and other related business owners and independent workers bereft of financial resources. Many sex workers had to choose between continuing to work and risk contracting the virus, or struggle. But the pandemic did not only affect in-person workers: as people moved online, so did sex work.

OnlyFans, a website made popular by erotic performers and cyber sex workers, experienced a steep rise in content creator signups following massive layoffs during the pandemic.[29] Earlier this year, a white, middle-aged mom was exposed as an erotic OnlyFans contributor by neighbors and parents, which resulted in the expulsion of her children from Sacred Heart Parish, a Catholic school in California. Said the principal: “your adult website is in direct conflict with what we hope to impart to our students and is directly opposed to the policies laid out in our Parent/Student Handbook.”[30] This is just one of multiple cases where people, usually cis women, have their erotic OnlyFans account exposed by coworkers, customers, or other “concerned” community members.[31]

In relation to this trend (of exposure), attorney Andrew J. Horowitz stated “it is perfectly legal for private employers to regulate employees’ activities outside of the workplace.”[32] Horowitz’s comments showcase a steady encroachment of capitalist-class employers on laborer’s private lives.

He cites a case involving a female employee whose male coworkers “discovered” her OnlyFans account and proceeded to blame her for the fallout and suggests that employers surveil their employees’ social media accounts and add detailed clauses to their employment contract to prohibit their employees’ activities outside of work—whether they derive income from them or not.[33] This reveals the normalization of surveillance and employer’s increasing control over worker’s’ lives.[34]

In addition to private employers’ pushes to regulate employees’ online activity, the federal government has made moves to censor it. In December 2020, senators from both the Democratic and Republican parties introduced the “Stop Internet Sexual Exploitation Act,” which directly targets Pornhub and similar sites that host pornography.[35] This in the midst of a global pandemic when women—mainly those who are nonwhite and work low-wage jobs—have been forced to drop out of the labor force in droves.[36] Such legislation shows a blatant lack of understanding of the many ways that criminalizing sex work targets people who are already economically marginalized.

Turning now more profoundly to the intricacies of a theory for our liberation, issues of age, race, class, sex, gender, and disability are complicating a movement previously dominated by white, middle class, higher-end perspectives. First, erotic laborers are a broad mélange of libertarians, neoliberals, radical leftists, socialists/communists, conservatives, and anarchists.[37] Second, and relatedly, the juxtaposition of decriminalization and legalization and discriminatory “models” that criminalize certain aspects of sex work have yielded a wide range of imprecise terms such as “full decriminalization.”[38] Some high end escorts would prefer to remain independent contractors, while others, myself included, have advocated for accessing labor protections by forming cooperatives or unionizing—although formal unions are not available to independent contractors due to antitrust laws.[39] I have also discussed brothels at length, positing cooperatives as a solution to the problem of madams and cis-heterosexual male brothel owners. None of these solutions is even close to being perfect. And, of course, this is all being discussed under the guise of the continuation of capitalism. In the words of anarchist Pedro Ribiero, “only the oppressed can liberate themselves.”[40] This means that much of our work may have to be accomplished without appealing to the State. Defunding the police and waging class struggle, along with advancing racial and gender equity, are a huge part of our work.

When I say “our work,” I am distinctly referring to the work of poor, queer, trans, and disabled nonwhite peoples and our comrades. Many of us are multiply marginalized and engaging in deviant occupations, and thus we cannot disentangle one mode of oppression from another. Connecting various forms of erotic labor to other forms of labor has proven to be incredibly complex—laws governing erotic labor vary widely from legal pornography and erotic dancing (stripping), to quasilegal cyber erotic labor (including cammodeling and selling access to explicit videos on sites like OnlyFans and ManyVids), to illegal prostitution (sex work), to selling erotic items such as underwear.[41] Currently, the sex worker rights movement has stalled around the issues of decriminalization/legalization and stigma.[42] During the pandemic, a debate arose about whether or not sex work is care work, or “essential work.”[43] More Black, Asian, Latine, queer and trans folks are involved, and more visible, in this current wave of the sex worker rights movement, than ever before.[44] Likely this is due to the ubiquity of social media, which increases the ability to connect and organize across borders.

With this connection comes tension. As a former street-based prostitute and current low end erotic laborer (of various modes), I have witnessed lupephobia from strippers/dommes complaining about dancers and fellow performers who do “extras.”[45] Extras could be anything from letting a customer palm your breasts where it is illegal to engaging in “illicit” activity with clients outside of the club.[46] Club owners often contractually prohibit dancing at parties outside of work. None of these restrictions are for the safety of the dancers; they are to protect the interests of the club and keep it from being targeted and shut down by law enforcement.

These tensions are inextricable from working conditions shaped by capitalism’s inherent exploitation of labor. For example, after erotic dancer Genea Sky fell from a two-story pole at XTC Cabaret in Dallas and fractured her jaw, she did not qualify for worker’s compensation because she was categorized as an independent contractor rather than an employee.[47] This is common for erotic dancers: club contracts often remove liability for club owners and place all responsibility for injury and assault on the dancers.[48] However, dancers are still required to behave as if they are employees, reporting to work for specific shifts and facing penalties should they not show up as scheduled. Yet they are still charged a “house fee” and they still have to tip out the staff.[49] This is the problem with sex work as “work.”

I prefer to approach sex work and erotic labor both as informal labor and as nonwork, or antiwork.[50] My initial rationale for trading sex was simple: I needed money. As I aged and got my first “real job,” I discovered something: I hated work. The longest I held a vanilla, or non-sexual, job was a year. Stripping, and various forms of prostitution (street-based, freestyle, hoeing, and sugaring), allowed me the flexibility I desired. Later, when I became a mother, camming, sugar dates, and amateur porn creation provided that same flexibility. Recently I was diagnosed with moderate-to-severe ADHD. After dropping out of college multiple times, quitting jobs, poor impulse control, social/productivity anxiety, and a second pregnancy, postpartum depression drove me to seek medical help. Disability makes it even more imperative that I not work. I am horrible at meeting deadlines, even self-imposed ones. Content creation (via ManyVids), phone sex, camming, and prostitution are my current modes of nonwork, along with writing, speaking engagements, and other gigs and informal labor. Thus, the phrase “sex work is work” is not very appealing to me, though I understand why some people are fans of it. As Kathi Weeks pointed out in The Problem with Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics, and Postwork Imaginaries, much of the utility of “sex work” comes from its relation to conventional work:

As a replacement for the label prostitution, the category helps to shift the terms of discussion from the dilemmas posed by a social problem to questions of economic practice; rather than a character flaw that produces a moral crisis, sex work is reconceived as an employment option that can generate income and provide opportunity. . .. The approach usefully demoralizes the debates about the nature, value, and legitimacy of sex for wages in one way, but it often does so by problematically remoralizing it in another; it shifts the discussion from one moral terrain to another, from that of a suspect sexual practice to that of a respectable employment relation.[51]

The conception of sex work in terms of work or antiwork may also usefully unsettle older narratives that have been both false and harmful. Empowerment and the related “sacred whore” mythos have roots in the first wave of the sex worker rights movement. During what many term the “sex wars,” sex workers basically had to choose between a binary of empowerment (to align with sex-positive feminists) or exploitation (the anti-prostitution/anti-porn “abolitionists”).[52] This led to a general erasure of most nonwhite, poor, immigrant, and LGBTQ perspectives, and a silencing of those on the margins of the movement whose experiences within sex work had been less than positive, or downright violent.[53]

Even though there are more Black, Asian, and Latine organizers and participants in the sex worker rights movement today, white-centricity is still somewhat of a problem within the movement. Nonprofit organizations and other public and private entities tend to function as (neo)liberal gatekeepers. The media tends to center or reach out to white cis sex workers first and foremost, and grants commonly contain specific requirements for how money must be used. Money is power in a capitalist economy, and white erotic laborers and anti-trafficking advocates simply have more access to it. By partnering with conservatives, radical feminists were able to advance the anti-prostitution cause with solid financial and social backing. Liberals and conservatives have united over trafficking, deemed “modern-day slavery,” ushering in (or perhaps benefitting from) a wave of social conservatism, concerned with:

[A] growing market economy commodifying more aspects of life, middle class concerns about race and immigration, feminist concerns about male sexual exploitation of women, conventional religious beliefs about proper gender roles, virtue, the family and sexual morality, and neoliberal ideologies which blame individuals rather than structures for social problems.[54]

Even intracommunally, support from alleged sex positive Black feminists and academics is capricious. Current discourse is plagued by cis-heterosexual women’s individual economic concerns (hypergamy, child support, cheating, etc.) and middle-class sentiments, blended with residual concerns from the second and third wave (marriage and motherhood as socially and economically oppressive, prostitution as a threat). Because the vast majority of sex worker clients are white, cisgender men, Black feminists’ political history around prostitution is complicated.[55] Prostitution is a class, as well as a racial, sex, and gender issue, for Black people. Audre Lorde’s renowned essay “Uses of the Erotic” is a shining example of the lupephobia embedded within our feminist lineage:

The erotic has often been misnamed by men and used against women. It has been made into the confused, the trivial, the psychotic, the plasticized sensation. For this reason, we have often turned away from the exploration and consideration of the erotic as a source of power and information, confusing it with its opposite, the pornographic. But pornography is a direct denial of the power of the erotic, for it represents the suppression of true feeling. Pornography emphasizes sensation without feeling.[56]

This supposed dichotomy between the erotic and pornography gives me pause. This perception is reflective of the way that sex work, including porn performance, is viewed by the masses, regardless of their political inclinations. Reaching back to Eileen Boros and Rhacel Salazar Parreñas’s conception of intimate labor and Amalia L. Cabezas’s notion of sexual-affective relationships,[57] I take issue with the reductive, moralistic claim that sexual services, erotic services which we trade for material or other compensation, are necessarily, or inherently, degrading and devoid of emotional return. Lorde writes:

The aim of each thing which we do is to make our lives and the lives of our children richer and more possible . . . . The principal horror of any system which defines the good in terms of profit rather than in terms of human need, or which defines human need to the exclusion of the psychic and emotional components of that need – the principal horror of such a system is that it robs our work of its erotic value, its erotic power, and life appeal and fulfillment. Such a system reduces work to a travesty of necessities, a duty by which we learn bread or oblivion for ourselves and those we love . . . . There are frequent attempts to equate pornography and eroticism, two diametrically opposed uses of the sexual. Because of these attempts, it has become fashionable to separate the spiritual (psychic and emotional) from the political, to see them as contradictory or antithetical.[58]

Erotic labor and writing sex worker theory have fed and clothed my children. It is necessary to complicate our perspectives on what it means to engage eroticism, while steering clear of the simplistic divine feminine empowerment narratives that have dominated sex worker rhetoric.

In response to both Alice Walker’s definition of womanism, and Audre Lorde’s conception of the erotic, I fashioned a philosophy that centers my deviant perspective. By coining proheauxism (proheaux womanism) and elaborating on what it means to be “pro-hoe,” I complicate these moral and social objections to whoredom with an anarcho-Black, community-centered, antiwork/anticapitalist, womanist stance:

proheauxism[:] 1. Proheaux womanism. Derived from the more colloquial “pro-hoe[]” ([s]pelling altered to reflect difference & refinement). A sex worker womanist, feminist, or hustler-heaux committed to collective and personal justice, not just sexually, but through recognition of labor and physical security. **Radically thotty, and proud of it**. Curious about their sexuality, about birth and rebirth, about challenge and change, about redemption and reparations, about the physical and the emotional. Loves the river in all its incarnations. A pro-sex, pro-pleasure politic that is specifically centered on the multiply marginalized. Might be: marvelous. One who owns oneself and one’s own sexuality or gender expression, regardless of whether or not they are attached to a man or masculine person.

2. A womanist who rejects antiheaux sentiments as well as respectability, racial capitalism, and whore hierarchies. Rejects misogynoir and transmisogynoir—all forms of misogyny, period. Does not accept nor engage in active or passive transphobia, homophobia, colorism, xenophobia, classism, or anti Blackness. Doesn’t juxtapose the erotic and pornography, and recognizes that non-exploitative pleasure comes in varied forms, is not always sex-centered, and is paramount to the human experience. Against all forms of erasure and systemic oppression. Recognizes that solidarity is impossible without acknowledging difference and rejects the urge to homogenize experiences under the guise of inclusivity.[59]

There are many things to consider when theorizing a practice of pro-sex worker, pro-pleasure politic. Under the current unjust system, we cannot appeal to non-sex workers’ morality. In the face of overwhelming signs and discrimination, we must demand ethical treatment. We must demand humanity, and humane policy that reflects and balances the needs of the multiply marginalized. I too desire to make the lives of my children “richer and more possible.”[60] Sex work has “erotic value” and, as (non)work, has bolstered my “life appeal and fulfillment.”[61] It is the empowerment/exploitation binary (choice vs. coercion), racism, classism, poverty, and ableist, prejudicial policy that have impeded me at every turn. The following pieces interrogate the reality of implementing a proheaux politic in the arena of policy. Clarifying the effects of recent legislation on the lives and livelihood of erotic laborers, the following brilliant pieces expose the impact of discriminatory legislation, and tentative victories, from an anti-racist, intersectional lens.

#### We’ll insert solvency advocate---

#### Replacing consumer welfare with worker considerations lets labor win---alternatives legalize exploitation and ban collective bargaining.

Inserted Firat Cengiz 20. School of Law and Social Justice, University of Liverpool. "The conflict between market competition and worker solidarity: moving from consumer to a citizen welfare standard in competition law". Cambridge Core. 10-8-2020. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies/article/conflict-between-market-competition-and-worker-solidarity-moving-from-consumer-to-a-citizen-welfare-standard-in-competition-law/6E783D1FC4BAB5605DFABCD17FBE3F35

Introduction

This paper offers a critical investigation of the law and economics of competition law enforcement in conflicts between workers and employers in the European Union (hereinafter EU) and the US. In such cases competition law comes into direct conflict with the principle of worker solidarity: according to the principle of market competition individuals are expected to take independent economic decisions and actions, whereas workers need to take collective economic actions and decisions to protect their interests. This conflict is particularly obvious in the context of the so-called gig economy,1 in which employers keep casualised workers at legal arms’ length to reduce labour and regulatory costs.2 If gig workers take collective action against their working conditions, they might face attack from competition law, because legally they might be considered independent service providers, rather than workers.3 The legal conundrum facing gig workers has become an increasingly popular subject in the law and economics literature.4 Nevertheless, the more fundamental question of how the enforcement of competition rules affects the overall position of workers beyond the limited case of the gig economy remains largely unexplored. This paper aims to investigate this broader and more fundamental question. In order to provide a sufficiently global answer, the paper focuses on the legal positions of the EU and US, as the leading competition law jurisdictions and primary competition policy exporters.5 The EU–US comparison shows that despite the slightly different legal tests applied in these polities, competition rules constitute nearly equally disciplining mechanisms against collective worker action on either side of the Atlantic. This paper also makes an original contribution to the emerging debate on whether and how competition law can contribute to wealth equality between citizens in the post-2008 crisis economy. The existing debate on the competition law–equality relationship takes the ‘consumer welfare’ standard as its main reference point: it focuses exclusively on the distribution of wealth between consumers and producers; as a result, it overlooks the production process that takes place before consumers meet products and services, and the position of workers within it.6 This is a natural result of competition law's reliance on a limited area of neoclassical economics called ‘equilibrium economics’ that understands efficiency exclusively as a market mechanism in which the price manifests itself where supply meets demand.7 Departing from the mainstream competition law and economics methodology, this paper builds its investigation on a holistic theoretical foundation, looking beyond equilibrium economics at labour exploitation theory as established in neoclassical as well as Marxian models. This analysis shows that despite standing at opposing ends of the political spectrum and whilst having some fundamental differences, Marxist and neoclassical models agree that collective worker action is economically beneficial and socially necessary. As a result, a critical analysis of the current legal situation on both sides of the Atlantic in light of this holistic framework illustrates how competition law's hostility towards collective worker action is not only unjust but also economically unsound. This paper demonstrates that the key problem in competition law's treatment of labour stems from the application of the consumer welfare standard in cases involving the competition–solidarity conflict without paying any attention to the idiosyncratic qualities of labour that render it naturally open to exploitation. Similarly, the consumer welfare standard overlooks the fact that consumers and workers are essentially the same group of people and one's welfare cannot be increased or decreased without affecting the other's.8 Even if worker exploitation could result in reduced labour costs and decreased prices, this cannot be deemed efficient as it reduces the workers’ welfare and results in broader negative socio-economic effects. Similarly, collective worker action resulting in higher labour costs and potentially higher prices cannot automatically be deemed inefficient, because although this might increase the prices consumers pay, they benefit from higher wages and better working conditions in their position as workers. As a result of this critical analysis, the paper proposes an original and more inclusive ‘citizen welfare’ standard that takes into account the economic effects of anti-competitive behaviour on workers as well as consumers. The citizen welfare standard could also potentially be applied in other contexts to solve long-standing conflicts between competition and other policy objectives, such as industrial, environmental and social policy objectives,9 although this paper primarily focuses on the application of citizen welfare to the competition–solidarity conflict. The structure of the paper is as follows: the next section provides an opening discussion of competition law, consumer welfare and equality. This is followed by a discussion of the economic theory of labour exploitation. Then, the paper investigates how competition law approaches the competition–solidarity conflict in the EU and the US. The fourth section critically discusses the EU and US legal positions in light of economic theory. This section also develops the citizen welfare approach as an alternative to consumer welfare for the resolution of the competition–solidarity conflict. This is finally followed with conclusions. Regarding terminology, this paper uses the term ‘worker’ (rather than employee) as a non-legal, generic term encompassing all individuals who make a living by providing labour power as a production factor in the production process of goods and services. Similarly, the term ‘labour’ is used to refer to the contribution of the workers to the production process as an abstract human factor. However, if the courts or authorities in question use a different term (such as employee) in a specific case, the paper uses the same term in the discussion of that specific case.

#### Unions are restricted by antitrust law.

Inserted Brishen Rogers 18. An Associate Professor at Temple University's Beasley School of Law, and a Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute. “The Limits of Antitrust Enforcement” Boston Review. 04-30-18. http://bostonreview.net/class-inequality/brishen-rogers-limits-antitrust-enforcement

Plus, the labor antitrust exemption **was never complete**, and as a result **contemporary antitrust directly restricts worker organizing in important ways***.* For example, businesses have challenged transnational efforts to raise wages for the world’s poorest garment workers as an antitrust problem, and they have **challenged unions’ efforts to build support among community allies** via private RICO suits that resurrect the old civil conspiracy doctrine. Contemporary antitrust also **prohibits organizing by independent contractors**, a category that includes many truck drivers, gig economy workers, and **many other vulnerable workers**. The posture of antitrust law in such cases is crucial: it doesn’t just fail to protect workers against employer retaliation, it **renders their efforts positively unlawful**. Under current law, Uber could likely obtain hefty damages from its drivers if they sought to unionize. Thus, what many workers need today isn’t old-fashioned trust-busting, but a rejuvenation of the old-fashioned antitrust exemption.